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ABSTRACT 
Following September 11 attacks, America has increased its intelligence and defense 
capabilities. In particular, a historic law named USA PATRIOT Act was passed by Bush 
administration together with President’s Surveillance Program. Though the emotional trauma and 
immediate strategic need to defend the homeland is understandable as it is commendable that the 
law was passed relatively quick, the Constitution of the United States is what makes this nation 
so developed and great. This inquiry will take a deep look into the law in relation to unwarranted 
surveillance over phone activities of the people and assess its constitutionality. To support the 
assessment, the development of the relevant laws, Section 215 of USA PATRIOT Act and 
Section 702 of FISA Amendments Act, and the precedents will be analyzed leading us to assume 
a probable future verdict of the Supreme Court of the United States had it heard this case today. It 
will be shown that such encroachments on civil rights and liberties is not novel and precede 
terrorism. Thus, further appropriation and amendments shall be made to the laws to bring it to 
respect rights to privacy and warrant requirement for search and seizure as guaranteed by Fourth 
Amendment. Analysis of European Law will be made, using examples of UK and France, and a 
dangerous trend will be shown illustrating that some leading members of the Union are adapting 
draconian laws and through cooperation agreements aiding the US into doing things they cannot 
legally do in the US. Seven recommendations will be proposed to put the laws in question in line 
with the US Constitution and bring more legitimacy to the process. 
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“[The makers of our Constitution] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their 
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, 
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Niccolò Machiavelli in the beginning of the sixteenth century in Prince claimed that war 
is a constant state of human nature, peace is just a break.
2
 In seventeenth century, Thomas 
Hobbes asserted that human society is in a condition of perpetual, or endless, war.
3
 The same can 
be said today about crises in general. Even countries that have not been in war for centuries 
nonetheless fall victim to international calamities that befall humanity. For example, Switzerland 
was last in war in 1847
4
 but refugee crises from wars in Africa or Syria did not go unnoticed for 
people of and in Switzerland. This study will look at a different type of crisis. It is one of our 
civil rights and liberties. It is one about, to put it with words of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. 
United States (1928)
5
, “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men” – “the right to be let alone”.6 
Dozens of innovative technologies, ideas and concepts, if not more, are being created 
every day. With regards to the level of human progress and population, it is not surprising. 
Nonetheless, the speed of life is faster than ever and it keeps accelerating. As any product 
humanity creates – it has ability to improve our lives as well as destroy it. An example of the 
latter can be seen from the Snowden leaks. After them, and future leaks that continue to come, 
people became more aware of what they speak, to whom and where. For example, numerous 
school and college students put tape over their web-cameras on their computers. People stopped 
feeling safe. 
Evidently, laws and legal protections, unfortunately, do not move at the same pace as 
innovation does. Therefore, there is some buffer time in which a lot of things can and do happen. 
During this buffer time, mass surveillance of people, of what they do, say, discuss, like or share 
in secret could be conducted for it would fall in legal “gray area”. And this could be done not 
only by governments. There are companies that could assemble and compile all the information 
available online about a person or group of people, this compilation is named Big Data. 
According to some representatives of one of Big Four Audit companies, financial institutions and 
                                                 
1
 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, L., dissenting) 
2
 See Niccoló Machiavelli, The Prince (Robert M. Adams trans., W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1977) (1532) 
3
 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Penguin 1985) (1651). 
4
 Which was a Civil War effectively creating Swiss Federation. See Charm Offensive — Switzerland’s ‘Polite War’ 
of 1847, Military History Now (January 18, 2013), http://militaryhistorynow.com/2013/01/18/charm-offensive-
switzerlands-polite-war-of-1847/ 
5
 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)  
6
 Id, at 478. 
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companies who provide services to them are already using Big Data and start involving them in 
their daily processes.
7
  
Google Inc. is a company that uses Big Data by tracking where people go (through 
Google Maps), what they search for, what they like with clicks on ads. From these, now, simple 
processes Google might know everything about anyone. Starting from which food one likes 
ending with his/her sexual preferences and hidden desires. Below, an example will be given of 
how can one deduct all life events happening in a life of a target just by looking at his/her phone 
calling records, obtained through Section 215 of USA PATRIOT Act.  
People would be rightly worried about their privacy. They would be rightly worried about 
whether this could be used against them. Though legally it cannot be, human history, American 
included, has seen governments or people in power abusing this very power for their own 
benefit. Sometimes, suppressing free press.  
It must be noted that, contrary to some popular belief, right to privacy is not mentioned in 
the Constitution of the United States in contrast to European Convention of Human Rights and 
Constitutions of several European states.  
With regards to the United States Constitution, though there is no written right to privacy 
in the Constitution, it exists as an implied right through Constitutional interpretation by the 
Supreme Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”).  
Because the study will be comparing the United States practice with European, putting 
great emphasis and analysis on American, the author of this study finds it prudent to give a brief 
introduction to the right to privacy in the United States and, later, explain origin of the issue 
together with its deeper importance.  
 
a. Right to Privacy 
In American law, the right to privacy exists under two main spheres/areas: (1) under tort 
law, affording tort damages for invasion of privacy, and (2) under constitutional law, protecting 
people’s right to privacy against unlawful governmental intrusion.8 This work will focus on 
Constitutional area of right to privacy.  
As noted by the Supreme Court in a landmark case, Roe v. Wade (1973)
9
: 
“Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy, the United 
States Supreme Court recognizes that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of 
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution, and that the roots of 
that right may be found in the First Amendment, in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, in 
                                                 
7
 More on Big Data and how the government is using it, see Chad Squitieri, CONFRONTING BIG DATA: 
APPLYING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE TO GOVERNMENT DATA COLLECTION, 101 Virginia Law 
Review 2011 (2015).   
8
 See 1-1 Data Privacy, Protection, and Security Law § 1.02 (2017) 
9
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
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the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, in the Ninth Amendment, and in the concept of 
liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.”10 
This short subsection will give a brief overview of the development of the right to 
privacy through the Supreme Court. It shall be noted and reiterated that the overview is not 
comprehensive but serves solely an informative, and introductory, role.  
The analysis starts with Olmstead v. United States (1928)
11
, where government decided to 
wiretap the conversations of a suspect, Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion, declared that 
right to privacy is “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men.”12 Nonetheless, the court found no violation of the Fourth Amendment. This case presents 
importance to the scholarly analysis and would be analyzed in detail further down the study.  
Thirty-seven years later, the Supreme Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
13
, in 
which use of contraceptives was discussed. Majority opinion written by Justice Douglas presents 
utmost importance to the right to privacy in America. It took the argument of the petitioner and 
through use of, not one or two but a set of, six Amendments created the right to privacy and 
issued strict scrutiny standard pertaining to these issues.  
Strict scrutiny is a legal standard that is most favorable to the individual. According to 
Black’s Law Dictionary,  
“In due-process analysis, the standard [is] applied to suspect classifications (such as race) 
in equal-protection analysis and to fundamental rights (such as voting rights).”14 
It was officially introduced by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944)
15
. 
The Supreme Court explained the test as follows: 
“In order to withstand strict scrutiny, the law must advance a compelling state interest by 
the least restrictive means available.”16 
Continuing with the case study of development of the Constitutional right to privacy, 
while Griswold was about use of contraceptives between married couple, in Eisenstadt, Sheriff v. 
Baird (1972)
17
 the issue was of use of contraceptives between an unmarried couple. Without 
going in detail, the Court held that there can be no discriminate treatment between married and 
unmarried couples, for this violates Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. But most 
importantly, the opinion reaffirms the right to privacy. “If the right of privacy means anything, it 
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child.”18 It is true that arguably the decision limited the right to privacy to childbearing, it 
                                                 
10 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) 
11
 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) 
12
 Id, at 478 (Brandeis, L., dissenting) 
13
 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
14
 STRICT SCRUTINY, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) 
15
 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
16 Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984) 
17
 Eisenstadt, Sheriff v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
18
 Id, at 453 
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nonetheless basically created a right not mentioned in the constitution. Further down the opinion, 
the implied character of the right was, however, noted. 
Roe v. Wade (1973)
19
 will be the case following Eisenstadt. In Roe, the Court applied the 
right to privacy to Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and reaffirmed the standard of 
strict scrutiny pertaining to these issues.  
Now the brief introduction to evolvement of right to privacy in America is finished, it is 
now prudent to continue with outlining the central issue of the study, explain its importance and 
relevance. 
 
b. Coming to the issue, study’s importance and structure 
Returning to the idea of Machiavelli perpetuated earlier – world exists in the constant 
state of war. And this war might not always be fought with guns – it might be in the form of 
competition or constant struggle for dominance. That is indeed the political realism theory.
20
 It 
must be noted though that that competition is probably the greatest force behind innovation and 
progress and thus has great benefits.  
Starting just from the second wave of colonization, one can already note that there has 
always been a growing threat to either peace and security of Europe or existential threat to the 
Western way of life. It all started with Germany, followed by Soviet Union and spread of 
Communism, came back to Germany, after World War II returned back to Communism, and 
after the fall of the Iron Curtain, with almost 10 years of political vacuum, “civilized world” 
found a new existential enemy. This new adversary was found in September 11, 2001– Islamist 
radicalism and Islamist terror. Though arguably Russia, with the rule of Putin, recently returned 
back to being existential threat to international peace and security, this threat might be a bit 
exaggerated.  
After September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States and the whole world ended the year 
with a state of shock. The countries were unanimous in their joint declaration of war against 
terrorism, or probably a more particular type of terrorism – Islamic radicalism.  
In essence, this war is similar to Cold War for in the Cold War the ideology of 
Communism was as great of an adversary as the Soviet Union. Therefore, in the United States a 
rise of radical anti-Communist sentiment exemplified in McCarthyism is seen. One could see 
similar rise of Islamophobia exemplified with stabbings in MAX Light Rail or, more recent, 
homicide of 17-year old Nabra Hassanen. In contrast to Cold War, where the greatest enemy was 
a State-actor with real threat of nuclear attack, the Communism was just another weapon, this 
new form of war is different where the greatest enemy is an ideology, without clear face. It also 
is asymmetrical for the radical groups target civilians to instill fear, whilst the attacks of State-
                                                 
19
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
20
 See Richard K. Ashley, Political Realism and Human Interests, 25 International Studies Quarterly 204 (Jun. 
1981). 
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actors against terrorists very often leaves numerous civilian casualties. The enemy is a non-State 
actor. Therefore, the foe is effectively invisible, for any person of any color could be member of 
such an organization and he/she does not have to wear any distinctive features
21
. Effectively, this 
war becomes more heavily reliant on counter-intelligence practices rather than preparations for 
war through weaponry development, like nuclear warheads in the Cold War. In such an 
environment, the time dictates for development and improvement of new communication 
interception, location pinning and individual identification technologies
22
. That is indeed what 
has taken place.  
However, it is essential that States do not forget main goal of the war – to preserve liberal 
ways of life instead of falling to the status of police states. These liberties and civil rights are 
indeed what distinguishes the Western liberal societies and democracies from the regimes that 
Islamist radicals want to impose on the world. Therefore, the question on civil liberties this study 
analyzes is fundamental to commonly valued democratic and liberal way of life. 
To narrow down the scope, the study selected phone surveillance to be the focal point. 
The reason is simple and self-evident – phones and electronic means communication became 
primary source of communication between people in distance. They are not solely means of 
communication anymore – together with most intricate details that our communications (be that 
voice, message or email) can reveal, they contain most private details of our lives through 
pictures, videos and other recordings. This view is shared by the United States Supreme Court 
too.
23
  
Due to nature of the threat, the object of surveillance becomes undetermined. Clearly, 
terrorists are intended subjects but due to difficulty of determination of such the subjects become 
effectively everyone. The study will reveal specific techniques and criteria used to determine 
investigation objects in two most famous relevant provisions of counter-intelligence laws 
pertaining to electronic communication surveillance in the United States. More specifically, USA 
PATRIOT Act’s Section 215 and FISA Amendments Act’s Section 702. The study will analyze 
its constitutionality and compare them to practices in the European Union.  
Again, assessment of constitutionality will be too complex for a limited space given. 
Therefore, the study will limit its focus to the Fourth Amendment, which reads as follows:  
 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”24 
 
                                                 
21
 See Andrew Campbell, ‘Taqiyya’: How Islamic Extremist deceive the West, National Observer 11 (Winter 2005). 
22
 Such as face recognition software 
23
 See Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2483 (1948) 
24
 U.S. Const. Amend. IV 
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The structure of the work will be as follows. The introduction will be followed by 
Chapter I, which analyzes precedents pertaining to the issue of communication surveillance and 
the Fourth Amendment. Next, Chapter II will begin analysis of Section 215 of USA PATRIOT 
Act, track its development and analyze its constitutionality. The study will make a commentary 
trying to predict future movements of the court in this area. Chapter III will go in the same 
direction as Chapter II but with Section 702 of FISA Amendments Act. Following will be 
Chapter IV where analysis of the similar practices and legal developments in the European 
Union will be analyzed. Finally, Chapter V will offer author’s recommendations to amend 
practices of intelligence agencies to conform with current and evolving civil standards.  
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CHAPTER I 
CELL PHONE COMMUNICATION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT – 
INTERPRETATION BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
To understand the evolvement of the constitutional interpretation and therefore of civil 
rights and liberty protections, in the course of our inquiry it becomes pivotal to review the case 
law most pertinent. This chapter will analyze the precedents most relevant to the study. 
Unreasonable searches and seizures were subject to civil actions long before 1791 and 
landmark English cases, such as Entick v. Carrington and Three Other King’s Messengers25, can 
serve as evidence. However, these laws were intended and interpreted as non-trespass rules only, 
as was the Fourth Amendment for the Supreme Court of the United States for a long time. And it 
continued to be seen as such until Boyd v. United States (1886)
26
. 
Written by Justice Bradley the opinion recalls Lord Camden’s judgment in Entick v. 
Carrington and presumes that “its propositions were in the minds of those who framed the fourth 
amendment to the constitution”.27 In there, Lord Camden reasoned that “[t]he great end for 
which men entered into society was to secure their property.”28 Explaining that property is an 
inviolable good and that instances where trespass, and seizure, is permitted must be clearly 
defined by law. If law is silent, then trespass is unlawful. Similarly, secrets in letters and 
documents are “[men’s] dearest property” and therefore, even absent of physical intrusion of 
space, the violation of secrecy of these documents constitutes trespass.
29
 This court has used the 
same logic and further emphasized the inviolability of personal property and papers, and gone 
even further by decreeing that courts have no right to order production of evidence from 
defendants, which might convict them.  
Subsequently, the Court continuously condemned search and seizure of defendants’ home 
or property without a warrant and continuously found those to be in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. Among those were – Weeks v. United States (1914)30, ex parte Jackson (1878)31, 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920)
32
, Amos v. United States (1921)
33
, Gouled v. 
United States (1921)
34
.  
Surely, Boyd’s view did not last long, for it’s a bit radical take, and in subsequent cases 
was indirectly overturned. Nonetheless, even taking these views into account, as propagated in 
                                                 
25
 Entick v. Carrington and Three Other King’s Messengers, EWHC KB J98, 95 ER 807 (1765) 
26
 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) 
27
 Id, at 626. 
28
 Id, at 627. 
29
 Id, at 628.  
30
 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) 
31
 ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878) 
32
 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 385 (1920) 
33
 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) 
34
 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) 
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Boyd v. United States, what approach should the government take with phone communication? 
First, nothing was ever mentioned or even thought about phones in Boyd and Entick, simply 
because they did not exist yet. Second, the letters are something that was sealed and sent, openly 
declaring that the contents of the letter are secret, while phone conversations are something that 
can be overheard – so are they really a “dearest property” of men?  
First case to ask this question was Olmstead v. United States (1928)
35
. In their paper, 
FIGHTING CYBERCRIME AFTER UNITED STATES V. JONES, Gray, Citron and Rinehart 
gave a fascinating story about development of the telephone.
36
 A year after Bell’s and Watson’s 
“famous first telephonically transmitted words” in 1876, there were 3,000 active telephones in 
the United States.
37
 In 1902 “2,315,000 telephones were in service in the United States.”38 By 
1908, New York City alone had 800,000 phones.
39
 By 1927 telephone became an essential part 
of American life.
40
 As with any great invention, it might be used in a criminal way, be that 
directly or indirectly.  
Olmstead was suspected in violating the prohibition laws by importing and distributing 
the liquors. In the course of investigation police inserted wires into the telephone lines used by 
the suspect to listen to his conversations. Based on gathered information, or as a consequence of 
it, the prosecution had a strong case against the suspect. There was no trespass upon any property 
of the suspect. Nonetheless, Olmstead further appealed the decision of the district court arguing 
that law enforcement violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  
However, the Court declined to accept that, an intangible, conversation was intended to 
be protected under the Fourth Amendment. They justified that by explaining that warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is on tangible things only. “The amendment itself shows 
that the search is to be of material things-the person, the house, his papers, or his effects. The 
description of the warrant necessary to make the proceeding lawful is that it must specify the 
place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.”41 
The Court here, though using Boyd v. United States (1886)
42
, fails to tackle the logic of it 
– the reasoning used in the case. Instead, they just compare contrast fact situations, analyze 
approach and state the court’s ruling. In Boyd, the Court intentionally made clear that Fourth 
Amendment protects privacy of the people and explained that the enumerated things there are 
                                                 
35
 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) 
36
 David Gray, Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart, FIGHTING CYBERCRIME AFTER UNITED STATES 
V. JONES, 103 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 745, 752 (2013).  
37
 The History, Old Telephones, http://oldtelephones.com/the-history/ (last visited Apr 18, 2017); Talking Wires: 
The Development of the Telephone, Talking Wires: The Development of the Telephone, 
http://www.moah.org/talkingwires/talkingwires.html?KeepThis=true (last visited Jul 18, 2017). 
38
 Jennifer H. Meadows & August E. Grant, Communication Technology Update, 16 (2012). 
39
 Herbert N. Casson, History of the Telephone, 172-73 (1910). 
40
 Claude S. Fisher, America Calling: Social History of the Telephone to 1940, at 52-52 (1992); David Gray, 
Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart, FIGHTING CYBERCRIME AFTER UNITED STATES V. JONES, 103 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 745, 752 (2013). 
41
 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) 
42
 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) 
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just examples or different varieties available. Here, one sees clear reversal of the logic back to 
old common law non-trespass only understanding of the Fourth Amendment.  
One thing one should notice by reading these precedents is their names – United States is 
always there as a side, not a State. There is a simple explanation for that – Barron v. Baltimore 
(1833)
43
. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment was applied exclusively to the Federal 
government, and not the States. Therefore, in Olmstead reasoning, how the Court compares the 
practice of State Supreme Courts with their Constitutional variation of the Fourth Amendment is 
seen. This was so until Mapp v. Ohio (1961).
44
  
There truly an intellectual feast and eclipse of justice is seen. Justice Clark delivered the 
opinion and in there used Boyd v. United States (1886).
45
 This time though, he used logic of the 
opinion instead of the bare facts of it. Though incredibly interesting, this case is relevant to the 
current study only to the extent that it applies the Fourth Amendment to the States and puts back 
the Amendment to the logic of liberty of the people from warrantless governmental intrusion into 
their privacy. This logic was summarized in another landmark case – Katz v. United States 
(1967)
46
.  
This case is probably most important to us today for it gives standard against which 
future cases were decided.  
Due to previous continuous interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as non-trespass rule, 
in this case, the Court was asked whether a telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area 
and whether its physical penetration is required “before search and seizure can be said to 
[violate] the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”47  
The case concerned a man who was transmitting wagering information from Los Angeles 
to Miami and Boston, in violation of federal laws. FBI attached a listening and recording device 
to the outside of phone booth the petitioner was using to make calls for that illicit end. These 
recordings were then presented at the Trial Court, over petitioner’s objections. Federal Court of 
Appeals rejected the petitioner’s contention that these recordings, and evidences, were obtained 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The reason is the same as it was – there was no physical 
entrance. During oral hearings at the Supreme Court, both sides argued “strenuously” whether 
booth constituted a “protected area”.48 Majority Opinion of the Supreme Court, written by 
Justice Stewart, right away, claimed that the Court “decline[s] to accept this formulation of the 
issues.” They reasoned that the Fourth Amendment problems are not promoted by the 
“constitutionally protected area” and that Fourth Amendment rights cannot be translated into 
right to privacy.
49
 Regarding the latter point, the Court clarified that the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment go further than privacy protections “and often have nothing to do with privacy at 
                                                 
43
 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) 
44
 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) 
45
 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) 
46
 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 
47
 Id, at 350. 
48
 Id, at 351. 
49
 Id, at 350. 
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all.”50 Nonetheless, it was here the Court famously proclaimed, “The Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.” 51 
The government contended that the booth was made of glass and therefore the petitioner 
was exposed to public and thereby voiding the protection of the Fourth Amendment. However, 
the Court responded saying that the petitioner still wanted to exclude unwanted ear and the glass 
was intended for that purposes. Following Rios v. United States (1960)
52
 and ex parte Jackson 
(1878)
53
, the Court contended that if a person intends to keep things private, even if done in an 
area accessible to public, Constitutional protection can still be applied.   
“One who occupies [the telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll 
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the 
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to 
ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.”54 
Here the court introduces the progressive interpretation of the Fourth Amendment allowing 
future courts to adapt to technological progress.  
Next, the government contended that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment for 
there was no physical penetration. The Court admitted that it did previously use such 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Nonetheless, they noted that the property prerequisite 
has been waived already, in Warden v. Hayden (1967)
55
. In Silverman v. United States (1961)
56
, 
the Court held that seizure of intangible items without warrant can also constitute a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the Court concludes that “[o]nce this much is 
acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people -- and not 
simply "areas" -- against unreasonable searches and seizures,” the requirement of physical 
intrusion of space becomes irrelevant.
57
  Furthermore, the Court precluded law enforcement 
agents from warrantless search on grounds of presence of a probable cause even when the least 
restrictive means were exercised.  
Interestingly enough, the Court here seemingly introduces reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard but mentions it in relation to the individual only. Also, the court not only 
addresses specific exceptions to the judicial process of the search, the Court says “searches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”58 This means that all searches without judicial 
approval are in violation of the Fourth Amendment, except when they fall under “few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”59 These are three – if seizure is incident 
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to arrest, if it is conducted as a result of hot pursuit and if done by individual’s consent. The case 
failed to apply to those three exceptions.  
The Court unintentionally added another exception but this one was curiously not in the 
opinion itself. This exception was in the footnote of the opinion – famous footnote 23. “Whether 
safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in 
a situation involving the national security is a question not presented by this case.” Some 
scholars asserted that “This footnote suggested the possibility that agents could conduct national 
security and foreign intelligence searches without obtaining a search warrant.”60 
At least two concurring opinions play significant role in our study today. Justice Douglas, 
whom Justice Brennan joins, clarifies that such electronic searches are unconstitutional even 
when “national security” interest is invoked and a member of executive branch (disconnected 
from the case and investigation) authorizes such search. They reasoned that the Constitution 
intentionally required that such warrants be given by another, independent, branch – judicial. 
They underlined that executive, no matter how detached from the case, cannot be independent.  
Next concurring opinion, by Justice Harlan, is of special importance to us. Here, Justice 
Harlan introduces two-prong standard/test for cases concerning unwarranted searches and 
seizures. First prong is whether an individual had a subjective expectation of privacy. Second is 
if that expectation is one that the society can recognize as reasonable.  
This case is important to us for the subsequent court decisions have taken Justice 
Harlan’s standard in analyzing future cases. Therefore, for no new standard arose nor this was 
explicitly overturned, we will also use it for the analysis section.  
National Security exception to the Fourth Amendment is often discussed by the 
government. United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan et 
al. (known as Keith)
61
, though sided with the individual and found that government violated the 
Fourth Amendment by wiretapping conversations of White Panther Party who tried to bomb CIA 
office in Michigan, indirectly created the national security exception.  
“We emphasize, before concluding this opinion, the scope of our decision. As stated at 
the outset, this case involves only the domestic aspects of national security. We have not 
addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to 
activities of foreign powers or their agents.”62  
Furthermore, the Court states that surveillance conducted on US soil should be subject to 
the Fourth Amendment requirements, because of the dangers of abuse of power. Thereby, the 
Court in Keith leaves door for unwarranted surveillance of foreign agents and of persons located 
outside the United States. The criticism for users of Keith to warrant national security exception 
is that the Court does not give a blank check for national security matters. In fact, the Court 
states, “constitutional basis of the President's domestic security role … must be exercised in a 
manner compatible with the Fourth Amendment.”63 Therefore, unwarranted wholly domestic 
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surveillance is unconstitutional. As it shall be seen, Section 702 of FISA Amendments Act will 
try to fit this framework. Nonetheless, as Senator Edward Kennedy was quoted in Justice 
Douglas’ concurring opinion, there is “the frightening possibility that the conversations of untold 
thousands of citizens of this country are being monitored on secret devices which no judge has 
authorized and which may remain in operation for months and perhaps years at a time. Even the 
most innocent and random caller who uses or telephones into a tapped line can become a flagged 
number in the Government's data bank.”64 As the world community discovered about Section 
215 of Patriot Act and Section 702 of FISA Amendments Act through Edward Snowden leaks, 
this scenario is not a mere possibility anymore – it is, unfortunately, ongoing reality. 
Four years later, 1976, the Court decided another case on Fourth Amendment. In United 
States v. Miller
65
, the Court analyzed whether personal records obtained through a third party 
constitutes Fourth Amendment violation. In this case, Banks where respondent had accounts, 
upon receiving subpoenas, handed over to the government checks, deposit slips and financial 
statements of the respondent. Court affirmed that “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government 
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a 
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
66” With this 
case, the government received assurance from the Court that people had diminished expectation 
of privacy in cases when persons voluntarily conveyed personal information to a third-party, 
even if they had reasonable expectation that this information or these records remain private. In 
particular, this case emphasized that records conveyed “in the ordinary course of business” are 
no longer private and can be requested through subpoena or directive without warrant given on 
probable cause.
67
 This will be further used by the government extensively. With our 
conversations becoming more electronic and being more dependent on a third-party (business), it 
basically leads to a state when none of our conversations would be protected for people always 
have an intermediary business recording our conversations or passing our conversations through 
their service as an ordinary course of business. This will be until the Court would recognize that 
electronic communications are protected under the Fourth Amendment. In Kyllo v. United States 
(2001)
68
, the Court will put a cornerstone for such an interpretation, on which, in turn, the Court 
built the Constitutional understanding of Riley v. California (2014)
69
, which would be vital for 
our analysis further on.  
What is most important for this study’s aim is that with Katz70, the Court opened the door 
onto flowing interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, which can be compatible and adaptive to 
technological progress. This brought new questions about what exactly are the reasonable 
expectations of privacy of individuals and the society. Where do we draw a line?  
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A major Supreme Court case asking one such question was Smith v. Maryland (1979).
71
  
Michael Lee Smith, after robbing Patricia McDonough, started to make obscene and 
threatening calls to her home. At some point, he asked her to step out to the porch. After doing 
so, Ms. McDonough observed a car she saw near the crime scene and later described to the 
police. Police also observed a man and a car matching victim’s description in the victim’s 
neighborhood. By tracking the license plate numbers, police, without a warrant, requested the 
telephone company to install pen register to record phone numbers dialed from the petitioner’s 
phone. The company complied. Upon examination of the register, police learned that calls have 
been placed from petitioner’s home to the victim’s home. They obtained a warrant and searched 
Mr. Smith’s home, where they have found a phone book folded on a page with Ms. 
McDonough’s name and number. Mr. Smith was arrested and recognized as the robber by Ms. 
McDonough in a six-man line-up. On trial, petitioner requested all fruits from warrantless pen 
register be suppressed. Trial court rejected the motion. Court of Appeals also declined to accept 
that warrantless pen register constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment for the lack of 
“reasonable expectation of privacy into numbers dialed into a telephone system.”72   
Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts’ interpretation of facts. The opinion of the 
court rendered by Justice Blackmun reasoned that an individual does not have legitimate 
expectation of privacy of phone numbers dialed. The Court expressed “doubt that people in 
general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.”73 People dial 
numbers they know will be transferred to the phone company to make the call. And even if, 
somehow, the petitioner had some reasonable expectation of privacy – it is not “one that society 
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’.”74 Many reasons were given. For example, the phone 
companies in their terms of service stipulate that they can record phone numbers for billing 
purposes or to inform clients on the source of unwanted calls.  
Therefore, now it must accepted that pen register is outside the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment. It shall be noted, however, that court did comment on limited capabilities of pen 
register, “Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from the use of a pen 
register whether a communication existed. These devices do not hear sound. They disclose only 
the telephone numbers that have been dialed -- a means of establishing communication. Neither 
the purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, 
nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers."
75
  
However, this also raises an important practical (constitutional) question – if these 
numbers are not protected because they are transferred to a third-party, can the government just 
intercept these numbers before they reach the company? The scholarly analysis leads to suggest 
that according to Smith the government should obtain the data “from and with the knowledge of 
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the third party.”76 It is also suggested by Smith and by scholars that the third-party doctrine rests 
on voluntary disclosure. Today, it seems appropriate to ask how voluntary are our disclosures to 
the phone service or internet provider companies. Without these third-parties people would not 
have possibility to use technology. Therefore, if one takes Smith precedent as leading today, one 
is obliged to accept the reality that if one lives in the society of the 21
st
 Century, he/she does not 
have Civil Liberties guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.  
This point was actually raised by Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in United 
States v. Jones (2012).
77
 She pointed out that people are voluntarily giving up “a great deal of” 
personal information by performing mundane tasks. She noted that for that reason, it should not 
mean that only because a person is giving up personal information to a third person for a limited 
purpose – this person has limited expectation of privacy and is, therefore, disentitled from the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection. Most importantly to the point of this study is that she noted that 
such, current, approach is ill suited for the digital age. This study agrees with this assessment.  
Next, the study will analyze Kyllo v. United States (2001)
78
. It must be noted that the 
subject in this case is not directly related to the issue at hand. However, as it was stipulated at the 
page 15, the decision plays an important role in the subsequent relevant and important Court 
decision, Riley v. California (2014). Furthermore, it plays an important role in illustrating that 
the Court begins to adapt to the development of technology. 
Danny Kyllo was suspected to be growing marijuana at his home. Usually, when 
marijuana is grown in home conditions, a certain technology is used – high intensity lamps.79 
Agents from US Department of Interior used thermal imaging scanner to observe thermal image 
of Kyllo’s house. Using these images, the government obtained a search warrant into Kyllo’s 
house. Kyllo, in District Court, filed motions to suppress evidence obtained through thermal 
imaging scanner on the grounds that the procedure violated the Fourth Amendment. District 
Court disagreed, Circuit Court remanded but District Court again denied motion to suppress and 
Circuit Court after change of composition agreed. The United States Supreme Court agreed with 
the arguments of the petitioner and ruled that use of thermal imaging is against reasonable 
expectation of privacy and constituted a search for it revealed to user the information not 
intended for public use. 
80
 This case is important to us in that the Court reaffirmed that Fourth 
Amendment interpretation should be adjusted to the emerging technology. “The Court 
recognized that it must sometimes confront the question of what limits there are upon this power 
of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy. In a case involving a thermal-imaging 
device aimed at a private home from a public street, which revealed details about the interior of 
the home that previously could have been known only by physical entry, the Court declared use 
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of the device to be a search, rejecting a rigid interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that would 
leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology.”81 
So, listening to one’s conversations without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment but 
installing the pen register to know what numbers one called does not. But what about searching 
one’s phone digital information after arrest? Technically the phone is a fruit to the arrest.  
In Riley v. California (2014)
82
 the Court resolves this issue. Being more precise this 
opinion is a decision on two cases – David Leon Riley v. California and United States v. Brima 
Wurie. Both “raise a common question: whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital 
information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.”83  
In both cases, as it may be obvious, people were arrested, their phones then searched and 
later convicted of crimes using evidences obtained from, and as a result of, the information 
contained on the phones. Though not explicitly noted in the opinion, this case is related much 
more to Johnson v. United States (1948)
84
 than just for the issue of warrantless search. In these 
cases, as it is in Johnson, officers gained evidence for conviction for serious crime only after the 
arrest. The big difference is that in Johnson the court found that the arrest was unjustified and 
therefore search of premises incidental to arrest was not either, while in Riley the Court agrees 
with justifiability of arrest without agreeing with the justifiability of search.  
But back to Riley. The Court made a great remark that is hard to ignore or pass by: 
“In 1914, this Court first acknowledged in dictum ‘the right on the part of the 
Government, always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of 
the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime.’ 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652. Since that time, it 
has been well accepted that such a search constitutes an exception to the warrant 
requirement. Indeed, the label “exception” is something of a misnomer in this context, as 
warrantless searches incident to arrest occur with far greater frequency than searches 
conducted pursuant to a warrant. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.2(b), p. 132, 
and n. 15 (5th ed. 2012). 
Although the existence of the exception for such searches has been recognized for a 
century, its scope has been debated for nearly as long.”85 
In particular, the Court noted, the scope of how far could law enforcement officers search 
the arrestee without a warrant was debated. The opinion informed us that, as of now, there are 
three cases that govern this issue: Chimel v. California (1969)
86
, United States v. Robinson 
(1973)
87
 and Arizona v. Gant (2009)
88
.   
                                                 
81
 David Medine et al., Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board, at 121 (2014) (internal quotations omitted). 
82
 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014) 
83
 Id, at 2480 
84
 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) 
85
 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2483 (1948) 
86
 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) 
87
 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) 
88
 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) 
 20 
Chimel “laid the groundwork for most of the existing search incident to arrest doctrine.”89 
In there, police after arresting a suspect at his home, without a warrant searched his house in 
entirety (including attic and garage)
90
. Chimel Court explained that search without a warrant 
upon arrest is justified on arrestee’s person and as far as the area is reachable to him/her to gain 
possession of weapons or destroy evidence. Extensive search in this case was, therefore, not 
justified. 
In Robinson, police officer arrested Robinson for driving with a revoked license and upon 
patdown search found a crumpled cigarette pack in one of his pockets. Removing and opening it, 
he found 14 capsules of heroin.
91
 Appeals court found that the search was unjustified for 
Robinson was unlikely to have evidence for arrest on his person, nor was extracting and opening 
a cigarette package going to prevent danger to the life of the officer.
92
 The Supreme Court found 
this search to be justified. “The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial 
arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a 
court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or 
evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect 
based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion 
being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.”93 
Therefore, as Riley court explained, the Court allowed search of arrestee without having 
reasonable threat to officer’s life or destruction of evidence. But the Court clarified in United 
States v. Chadwick (1977) that “this exception was limited to ‘personal property ... immediately 
associated with the person of the arrestee.’”94 
Gant recognized that Chimel concern for officer safety and evidence preservation are 
essential to warrantless search. Applying the case to car circumstances, Gant Court explained 
that search of the car is justified if the suspect is unsecured and might get a hold of a weapon. 
The passenger compartment search might also be justified if there might be evidence relevant to 
the crime.
95
 Gant Court determined that search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth 
Amendment did not justify the search in this case.
96
 
To decide this case, the court used balancing test of Wyoming v. Houghton (1999)
97
 as, 
they clarified, it was used to decide Robinson. In this test, the Court “assess[ed], on the one hand, 
the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”98 Cellphone data and 
information, the Court explained, did not pose danger to the officers, nor was it likely that 
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arrestee could destroy evidences without phone in his possession. The searches of person of 
arrestee is brief while search of the phone data intrudes on the most private information of the 
phone owner. Therefore, such search required a warrant. The Court admitted that search of the 
phone can be justified if only the physical aspects would be searched. On the arguments by the 
United States and California that evidence might be destroyed also remotely, the Court said that 
police had enough capabilities to prevent that. Furthermore, the data (evidence) could not be 
destroyed by the suspect himself remotely while being in custody.  
Therefore, in practice, we have prohibitions of law enforcement agencies to search 
phones of suspects without a warrant be they in custody or just under investigation. Nor does the 
law enforcement have a right to read people’s conversations without a warrant, unless it is based 
on legitimate, work-related justification.
99
 Leading precedent for the latter is City of Ontario, 
Cal. v. Quon (2010)
100
.  
There an officer of police department was using his work pager for his personal matters 
and thereby going over the imposed character limit and paying the fine. While officer was, 
without objection, paying out the fines, the police department wanted to investigate if the 
character limited was too small, so that if they were these would be increased for workers to 
avoid fines, or the workers were using all those characters for personal means. For that end, they 
requested transcript of texts of officer Quon and found out that most of his texts were not work 
related. An internal investigation was conducted, where all messages sent of duty were redacted 
out, which found that most messages were not work related and thereby Quon was disciplined 
for violation of OPD rules. Quon sued on grounds of Fourth Amendment violation. Trial court 
found that he did have reasonable expectation of privacy but, citing plurality opinion of 
O’Connor v. Ortega (1987)101, determined that investigation was justified and reasonable under 
work-related grounds. Court of Appeals did not agree that the investigation was reasonable even 
under legitimate work-related grounds. The Supreme Court assumed that Quon had reasonable 
expectation of privacy, though whether it was really so remained questionable. The Court noted 
rapid development of telecommunication and indicated that “[p]rudence counsels caution before 
the facts in the instant case are used to establish far-reaching premises that define the existence, 
and extent, of privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided 
communication devices.”102 Therefore, the assumptions were made to tailor the decision into this 
particular case. And then they examined the reasonableness of “search” made by the department 
of his text exchanges. They found that it, in fact, was reasonable for it was done under legitimate, 
work-related purposes, was not excessively intrusive and tailored to the specific purpose of the 
search. Furthermore, the Court noted that it would be a similar investigation would be normal if a 
private company conducted it on their own personnel.  
To finally sum up, search of phone content as well as listening to conversations (be that 
text or voice) without a warrant is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, Katz and Riley. 
This applies to all situations, even if phone owner (suspect) is arrested, Riley. There are 
                                                 
99
 City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619 (2010)  
100
 Id. 
101
 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) 
102
 City of Ontario, Cal, v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) 
 22 
exceptions – the phone physically could be searched by an officer if it is incident to arrest, Riley. 
Also, the text conversations could be “searched” if government acts as an employer and acts 
under legitimate, work-related purposes and this search is not overly intrusive, Ontario.  
Next, the study will analyze if provisions of PATIOT Act Section 215 together with 
FISA Amendments Section 702 are compatible with the Fourth Amendment, as currently 
interpreted by the Court. 
 23 
CHAPTER II 
SURVEILLANCE UNDER SECTION 215 
This chapter will analyze the history of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, assess its 
value and constitutionality using the precedents analyzed in the previous chapter. 
The discussion of Constitutionality of Sections 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot 
Act) and 702 of FISA Amendments Act (FAA) requires us to discuss in detail what these 
sections entail. This is vital not only because it will be fundamental for reader’s comprehension 
of the issue at hand but to avoid “value to national security” argumentation by possible critics. 
This sub-chapter intends, to the best of study’s length constraints, to track the development of the 
circumstances around Section 215 and discuss its value to the war on terror. To this end, reports 
issued by Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) will be used and supplemented 
with further analysis and discussions.   
 
“The PCLOB is an independent bipartisan agency within the executive branch 
established by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
The Board is comprised of four part-time members and a full-time chairman, all 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Board’s authorizing statute 
gives it two primary responsibilities:  
To analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to protect the Nation from 
terrorism, ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced with the need to protect 
privacy and civil liberties; and   
To ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and 
implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation 
against terrorism.” 103,104  
 
On January 23, 2014, PCLOB published a Report on the Telephone Records Program 
Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court. In this report, the PCLOB provides description and history of 
the NSA Section 215 Program, together with statutory and constitutional analysis thereof, 
concluding with recommendations regarding the program.  
As it turned out, Section 215 is, actually, not the initiating statute of the phone 
surveillance – it was initiated by the President’s Surveillance Program (hereinafter referred to as 
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“PSP”). In October 2001, President George W. Bush issued “highly classified” authorization “to 
collect certain foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance…without judicial warrants or court 
orders for limited number of days.”105 With this order NSA was authorized (1) to collect contents 
of “certain international communications” and (2) collect bulk metadata of telephone and 
Internet communications.
106
 These authorizations were renewed “every thirty to sixty days” until 
2007.
107
 
Unclassified Report, prepared by the Office of Inspectors General of the DOD, DOJ, 
CIA, NSA and ODNI, stated that said “program became less a temporary response to the 
September 11 terrorist attacks and more a permanent surveillance tool.”108 
In March 2004 after reassessment of the program by Office of Legal Counsel (hereinafter 
referred to as “OLC”) and lengthy discussions within the Administration, President discontinued 
bulk collection of Internet metadata under PSP.
109
 
It is imperative to understand what “metadata” means and entails in this context. 
Metadata can be described as “data about data” for it is basically information on communication 
without communication content in it. In regards to phone communication, metadata serves as 
information a pen register, discussed in Smith v. Maryland (1979)
110
, would usually yield – 
numbers, dates, duration and time. In regards to Internet communication, metadata usually refers 
to information on senders and receivers of messages. 
In December 2005, the New York Times (hereinafter referred to as “NYT”) published a 
number of articles revealing interception of contents of international email and phone 
communication authorized by the PSP. These, as it shall be discussed later, will be transferred, 
through FISA Amendments Act, under authority of Section 702 of Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (hereinafter referred to as “FISA”). Though the concerns of the phone 
companies were calmed down after “white paper” issued by the government in response to the 
said articles, they were uneasy about pen registers not mentioned in the articles. USA Today 
began investigation on metadata collection in the beginning of 2006.
111
 In May 2006, 
government started transition of metadata collection from PSP to FISA “business records” 
(hereinafter referred to as “BR”) provision.  
FISA BR provision, enacted in 1998, allowed FBI to apply for FISA court order requiring 
a business “to release records in its possession for an investigation to gather foreign intelligence 
information or an investigation concerning international terrorism.”112 Orders could be applied to 
four types of businesses only – “a common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical 
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storage facility, or vehicle rental facility.”113 “Any application for such order was required to 
attest that there were specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to 
whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”114 
Patriot Act’s Section 215 expanded the FISA BR provision substantially. FBI was no 
longer limited to four types of businesses. Now, it could apply for an order requiring the 
production of “any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other 
items) for an investigation to protect against international terrorism.”115 The law qualifies this 
rule stating that these can be done as long as the motive for it is not based “solely on the basis of 
activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.”116 FBI also no longer needed to 
demonstrate “specific and articulable facts”. Instead, they just needed to “specify that the records 
were being sought ‘for an authorized investigation’ conducted under guidelines approved by the 
Attorney General.”117 However, these measures were intended to be temporary and set to expire 
in 2005 (later extended to 2006).
118
 
The debates on reauthorization of Section 215 of Patriot Act began in 2005. These were 
taking place at the same time as those regarding limitation of scope of Section 215 and transfer 
of metadata collection under PSP to Section 215.
119
 Because PSP was classified, public discourse 
was evaded.  
As a result, the Act was amended to require FISA courts to issue BR orders after 
determination that sought records were “likely relevant” to FBI investigation.120 Also, the items 
that could be obtained were have to be “obtainable through grand jury subpoenas, administrative 
subpoenas, or court orders.”121 In March 2006, President Bush signed the amendments to the Act 
into law. By May of the same year, Congress renewed Section 215. At the same month, the 
government completed their application with supporting memoranda to the FISA court. 
Referring to the word “relevant” in the law, the government argued that deference should 
be given to “the fully considered judgment of the executive branch” in assessing what is 
relevant.
122
 They also argued that interpreting this word Supreme Court’s ‘special needs’ 
jurisprudence must be used, “which balances any intrusion into privacy against the government 
interest at stake to determine whether a warrant or individualized suspicion is required.”123 This 
                                                 
113
 Id. 
114
 (Internal quotation marks omitted) Report pages 40-41 (50 U.S.C. §1862(b)(2)(B) (2000)) (as cited by the 
PCLOB) 
115
 Report page 41. 50 U.S.C. §1861(a) (1) (2002) (as cited by the PCLOB); see also Steven G. Stransky, The 
Fourth Amendment and Bulk Telephone Metadata: An Overview of Recent Case Law, 35 Saint Louis University 
Public Law Review 3 (2015). 
116
 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1), (c).   
117
 David Medine et al. supra note 104,. at 41; 50 U.S.C. §1861(b) (2) (2002) (as cited by the PCLOB) 
118
 David Medine et al. supra note 104,. at 41 
119
 Id 
120
 Id., at 42 
121
 Id. 
122
 Id. 
123
 Id, at 44 
 26 
means that if NSA says that the application is relevant the Court must take it as granted because 
NSA “knows better” and any intrusion into privacy is justified.  
Furthermore, even though an immense amount of information is related to non-terrorist 
activities and persons, all information is still relevant for later analysis.
124
 It must be admitted, 
this explanation is a bit confusing for we do not know why would they need so much information 
about innocent civilians for “later analysis”. Is it to know with whom did those civilians 
communicate after they communicated with a terrorist they never knew he/she could be capable 
of such things? Or is it because potentially everyone can become a terrorist, so NSA better to 
know with whom they communicated before and after right away? 
As duly noted by Stephanie Pell and Christopher Soghoian, from Stanford and Yale Law 
Schools respectively, “common sense” reading of the law, of Section 215, “does not, on its face, 
appear to permit collection on this scale.”125 They explain, as does the author of this study, that a 
great database with the metadata of virtually every American cannot be deemed relevant because 
only “some of the records in that database are actually relevant to an investigation.”126 David 
Medine, Jim Dempsey and Patricia Wald, from the PCLOB, also agree with this assessment and 
submit that practice of Section 215 does not comply to its own statutory language.
127
  
It must be noted that these memoranda heavily relied on a past decision of FISC on 
internet metadata collection ignoring the fact that records were acquired only if they travelled 
through certain designated communications channels (likely to be) related to terrorist activity so 
to be “richly populated” with terrorism related communications.128 What we do know, from the 
White Paper published by the Obama Administration in 2013, is that the program was designed 
to allow queries into the data be only on “identifiers” “that [are] associated with one of the 
foreign terrorist organizations that was previously identified to and approved by the Court.”129 
However, the approval of the Court looks more as formality before the Constitution rather than 
safeguarding mechanism. Also it ignored the discussion that it was FBI to apply for orders and 
obtain the records, under Section 215.  
Judge Malcolm J. Howard signed an order approving the government application and in 
his order included the requirement that “records could be searched only with selections terms for 
which there already was ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ [(hereinafter referred to as “RAS”] of 
connection with terrorism.”130 
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So, collection of metadata under PSP continued without a break but now under Section 
215 of Patriot Act.  
Another fundamental thing to note is that FISA orders as they were operated (issued as 
blanket orders for 90 days subject to renewal) are questionable under the Fourth Amendment. 
Justice Douglas in Katz v. US concurring opinion noted that even in matters of “national 
security” members of the executive branch, be that President or Attorney General, cannot be an 
independent or detached magistrate. Therefore, applying it to this case, FISC was established to 
serve as such and issue orders on case-by-case basis. The most important reason is that rights 
under the Fourth Amendment belong to everyone in the United States and not the American 
society in general, as a unitary group. As it is and will be seen, the FISC has given the power of 
determination whether a person falls within RAS to the executive and the FISC serves as a mere 
formality. This also ignoring the fact that RAS is a generic standard that can be easily met having 
a decent legal advising and, especially, having all possible information on person and his/her 
contacts.  
The acceptance of such practice by Courts leads to a dangerous precedent where any 
interception of communication that passes through a third-party by the sole decision of the 
executive can be acceptable if it does not intercept spoken or written words. “After the 
PATRIOT Act broadened the definitional section of the Pen/Trap statute, DOJ interpreted the 
statute to authorize the collection of nearly all non-content information exchanged between a 
mobile device and a cell tower and, accordingly, advised prosecutors to obtain a Pen/Trap order 
when employing IMSI-catchers in an investigation.”131 These IMSI-catchers are a more 
advanced technology used by law enforcement agencies to intercept in real time “unique device 
identifiers and detailed location information of cellular phones—data that it would otherwise be 
unable to obtain without the assistance of a wireless carrier.”132 This technology can potentially 
send signals through the walls to locate and identify cell phones without service provider 
assistance or anyone knowing about that.
133
 
It is also imperative for the reader to understand the chaining system, can also be called 
“hop” system. As soon as an analyst puts a search term into the system, he/she will get 
information on all numbers directly in contact with the target (first hop), he/she will get 
information on all numbers directly in contact with all those numbers (second hop) and then all 
contacts directly in contact with those (third hop).
134
 As it stood since the beginning of operation 
of this program under Section 215, three hop search was permitted and any search beyond would 
be stopped by the software.  
  
a. Noncompliance or just blunt violations of law 
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Contrary to sworn attestations of several executive branch officials who filed declarations 
with the FISC about NSA’s program, NSA violated FISC orders regarding Section 215. In 
particular, NSA violated the requirement that analyst query only those who have been RAS 
approved.  
At the time of PSP, NSA has developed and implemented a software system named “alert 
list”. This system would scan new telephone records as soon as those would be input into the 
agency’s database. There were thousands of numbers of interest for NSA analysts but most of 
those have never been RAS approved. “As of January 2009, fewer than 2,000 of the nearly 
18,000 numbers on the alert list were RAS-approved.”135 This is whilst accepting the fact that it 
is not an independent magistrate that is approving the RAS but the NSA officials themselves.
136
  
After NSA notified FISC of the problem, the problem was attempted to be fixed but for 
the lack of success of doing so it was shut down. The government reasoned that these problems 
were due to misunderstanding of personnel of FISC order. Judge Walton noted that “since the 
earliest days of the FISC-authorized collection of call-detail records by the NSA, the NSA has on 
a daily basis, accessed the BR metadata for purposes of comparing thousands of non-RAS 
approved telephone identifiers on its alert list against the BR metadata in order to identify any 
matches…It is difficult to imagine why the Court would intend the applicability of the RAS 
requirement – a critical component of the procedures proposed by the government and adopted 
by the Court – to turn on whether or not data being accessed has been ‘archived’ by the NSA in a 
particular database at the time of access…[Such an] illogical interpretation renders compliance 
with the RAS requirement merely optional.”137 
Furthermore, “[d]uring a five-day period in April 2008, the NSA determined, thirty-one 
NSA analysts queried the telephone records database without being aware they were doing 
so.”138 Then NSA created modified access tool, which had to be installed by every analyst. In 
December 2008 one such analyst failed to install it and “inadvertently queried the data using five 
identifiers for which NSA had not determined that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard 
was satisfied.”139 With further investigations, more violations of orders have been found by the 
NSA.  
Responding to those violations, Judge Walton “wrote that he no longer had confidence 
that the government is doing its utmost to ensure that those responsible for implementation fully 
comply with the Court’s orders.”140 Because the government insisted that this program is crucial 
to national security, he was hesitant to order its stop. So, instead, Judge ordered that every search 
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should be approved by Court – an approach, in author’s opinion, most appropriate in respect to 
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  
But NSA did not stop there. In violation of FISC orders and “generally applicable 
dissemination rules governing all of the NSA’s activities[,]” the agency has inappropriately 
disseminated information to other intelligence agencies without minimization procedures.
141
 
NSA notified the Court that access to those records has been terminated.  
In August 2009, Agency claimed to FISC that it was doing its best to minimize risks of 
further violations by imposing expanded rules and restrictions. And then, the Agency applied to 
be the one to determine if RAS standard has been satisfied or not, again. In September, Judge 
Walton granted the application and Section 215 program continued as before.  
 
b. Value and USA FREEDOM Act 
“[W]e conclude that the Section 215 program has shown minimal value in safeguarding 
the nation from terrorism. Based on the information provided to the Board, including 
classified briefings and documentation, we have not identified a single instance involving 
a threat to the United States in which the program made a concrete difference in the 
outcome of a counterterrorism investigation. Moreover, we are aware of no instance in 
which the program directly contributed to the discovery of a previously unknown terrorist 
plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack. And we believe that in only one instance over 
the past seven years has the program arguably contributed to the identification of an 
unknown terrorism suspect. Even in that case, the suspect was not involved in planning a 
terrorist attack and there is reason to believe that the FBI may have discovered him 
without the contribution of the NSA’s program.” 142  
 
In June 2015, USA FREEDOM Act (Freedom Act) was passed ending bulk collection of 
metadata. However, please do note that metadata collection by itself under Section 215 did not 
end. It means that now the intelligence community will not be acquiring and storing metadata in 
bulks in their archives. Beginning November 2015, government under authorization of FISC 
after identifying “specific selection term” reasonably associated with terrorism can acquire call 
detail records up to two hops from telephone companies. 
 
c. Constitutionality 
 Seeing how the technology works it might be tempting to believe that Section 215 falls 
within the working precedent of the Fourth Amendment as regarding phone surveillance. After 
all, Section 215 does not record conversations and merely records numbers dialed by a user. 
These numbers, under precedent, are information transmitted to a third-party and, therefore, are 
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void of any protection of the Fourth Amendment. Inquiry for these numbers, subsequently, do 
not qualify as search. However, this subsection will try to illustrate that, despite little technical 
similarities, operations under Section 215 are different from pen-registry allowed under Smith, 
that they should be qualified as search, assessed its reasonableness and examined under 
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine.  
 It is true that by not recording the actual conversations, Section 215 resembles pen-
register. However, in such intricate matters, one assessing the constitutionality should look 
beyond first glance resemblance. This is primarily because the opinion given by the Court was 
detailed in outlining what pen-register did and, therefore, what they subsequently permit with 
their decision.
143
  
“Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from the use of a pen 
register whether a communication existed. These devices do not hear sound. They 
disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed -- a means of establishing 
communication. Neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the 
recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed 
by pen registers."144 
 
 Compare that to Section 215. Under FISA orders, “all call detail records” are being 
collected by the NSA. These “typically include much of the information that appears on a 
customer’s telephone bill: the date and time of a call, its duration, and the participating telephone 
numbers.”145   
This methodology can be problematic and lead to inaccuracies in interpretation. To 
illustrate that, a hypothetical can be used. Suppose there is Mr. Bruce Wayne and law 
enforcement has an investigation on him relating to his suspected ties to terrorists. By using pen 
register on Mr. Wayne, the law enforcement could see only the numbers he dialed, without 
further knowledge if there was any conversation at all. Obviously, by using pen register only 
they will never find Mr. Wayne calling terrorists, for he is a superhero – the Batman. Under 
Section 215 Program, on the other hand, the NSA would know not only of the attempted calls 
“but also the precise duration and time of each call.”146 Furthermore, the Agency would be able 
to access the same records of all the numbers Mr. Wayne was in contact with, and of all those 
who were in contact with them. These all include not only outgoing but incoming calls too. Now 
suppose that Mr. Wayne contacted Mr. Luthor on some occasion asking about what he did to his 
significant other. Then, on a completely separate occasion, Mr. Luthor contacts an Arab prince 
negotiating a large oil deal. The mentioned prince then contacts a known terrorist. Then, 
hypothetically, NSA has a confirmation (significant or not) to their suspicions that Mr. Wayne 
has some indirect ties to terrorism.  
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 Another hypothetical will illustrate the “mosaic theory” problem. Forget about terrorism 
aims and just look at how much can metadata really give us. Suppose that looking at one’s usual 
behavior, law enforcement (or anyone for that matter) can observe an unusual spike in 
gynecologist calls, followed by calls to or from husband. Later, records indicate calls from and to 
Mothercare store. Next, several months later, records indicate an unusual flow of calls to 
subject’s and her husband’s phones. These phone numbers belong to parents, supposed relatives 
and friends. We can also see calls from maternity home. Furthermore, we see unusual calls to a 
flower shop and delivery service. We note in both spouse’s records spike in calls to their 
supposed place of employment. We note calls to and from an insurance company. We can also 
see an increase in calls to people either related to medical field or pediatricians themselves. 
Though records do not identify people’s names, this can be done through reverse telephone 
directories for which a warrant is not required.
147
 Thus, circumstances of a particular call, calls or 
pattern of calls can be highly suggestive of their content and, subsequently, reveal most intimate 
details of one’s life – details for which a caller has a reasonable expectation of privacy. And the 
longer the surveillance is, the more it reveals. So, if surveillance were only a week, there would 
probably not be as many clues to suggest that the subject is having a child.  
 This problem is vividly illustrated in United States v. Jones (2012)
148
. However, for the 
illustration’s purpose, the best explanation of the problem is given not by Justice Sotomayor’s 
opinion
149
 but in the opinion of Judge Ginsburg from D.C. Circuit Court: 
 
“Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term 
surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he 
does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more about a person than 
does any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or 
a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as does one's not visiting any of these 
places over the course of a month. The sequence of a person's movements can reveal still 
more; a single trip to a gynecologist's office tells little about a woman, but that trip 
followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story. A 
person who knows all of another's travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, 
a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving 
medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political groups--and not just 
one such fact about a person, but all such facts.”150  
 
In fact, a former general counsel of the NSA, Stewart Baker, was quoted saying, 
“Metadata absolutely tells you everything about somebody’s life…[It’s] sort of embarrassing 
how predictable we are as human beings…If you have enough metadata you don’t really need 
content.”151 But why is it government’s fault that all this metadata gives so much information? 
Government, after all, just does its job in protecting national security, in protecting us. But 
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“government’s rampant misuse of its surveillance authority during the twentieth century to 
squelch domestic dissent in the name of national security was amply documented by the reports 
of the Church Committee, and was in fact the impetus for passage of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act.”152 Therefore, to protect the constitutional rights the Framers wanted the 
People of the United States to have, practice of law enforcement should adapt to the new 
realities.  
In Riley, the Court affirmed that with today’s development of technology, phones became 
an irreplaceable part of human life. “[C]ell phones…are now such a pervasive and insistent part 
of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature 
of human anatomy.”153 Court further noted the storage capacity of phones and found that access 
to one’s phone data constitutes a search: 
 
“One of the most notable distinguishing features of modern cell phones is their immense 
storage capacity. Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical realities 
and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow intrusion on privacy. […] Most 
people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have received for the past several months, 
every picture they have taken, or every book or article they have read—nor would they have 
any reason to attempt to do so. And if they did, they would have to drag behind them a trunk 
of the sort held to require a search warrant”154 
 
 In this case, we have not only log of messages but also log of calls supplied to the NSA 
every day and stored for five years. If we apply the metaphor used by the Court, then NSA is 
taking millions of pages’ worth of log- and phonebooks, without warrant. Looking at violation 
statistics, these searches are many times of innocent people not connected to terrorism in any 
way.  
 Now that we have Freedom Act, bulk collection of metadata ceased. NSA is also not able 
to access or retain the record archives on their own servers. Nonetheless, records are still being 
provided on a daily basis. Thus, mosaic-theory problem persists. If we follow Riley’s opinion’s 
logic, then it is likely that even reformed practice
155
 of Section 215 could be found in violation of 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment.  
A most practical solution would be to set a defined and short time limit for surveillance 
warrants, subject to renewal but only under a stricter standard showing the progress from the last 
warrant, explaining why is the individual still suspected and how much more time do they need 
to take action. This would stimulate law enforcement to limit the number and increase quality of 
searches, allowing only for result yielding pursuits, and decrease number people under constant 
surveillance. Another choice is for Court to apply strict scrutiny test on electronic surveillance 
cases such as this. Analysis of PCLOB found violations of First and Fourth Amendment with 
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Section 215. Discriminatory practice of searches based on race or religion are also observed.
156
 
Therefore, application of strict scrutiny seems fit for Section 215.  
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CHAPTER III 
SURVEILLANCE UNDER SECTION 702 
Following the Chapter on Section 215, it is now pertinent to the study to analyze Section 
702 of FISA Amendments Act in the similar fashion. Analogous to the previous one, this 
Chapter will discuss history, assess its value and constitutionality. While analyzing 
constitutionality, in contrast to the previous chapter, the author will use some cases from lower 
Federal courts.  
Section 215, in fact, shares common history with Section 702. As we already saw, these 
operations conducted under them started with the PSP - long before they were codified in FISA 
or Patriot Act. And they continued to be untouchable as president was continuously renewing 
them “with some modifications and constrictions to the scope of the authorized collection, 
approximately every thirty to sixty days until 2007.”157 Justifying the renewal with constant and 
ongoing extraordinary emergency. The legislature and FISC were only briefed on the existence 
of the program.  
As a reminder, in December 2005, the PSP was revealed through a series of articles in the 
NYT, which had international communications interception as the center of their attention. 
Though the government issued “white paper” outlining that the President had the authority to 
issue the PSP, it, nonetheless, went on to seek authorization for electronic surveillance through 
FISC. They requested FISC to issue the orders authorizing the surveillance with the government 
to make probable cause determinations. Court granted the order. This was “referred to as the 
‘Foreign Telephone and Email Order,’ [which] in effect replaced the President’s authorization of 
the [PSP], and the President made no further reauthorizations of the [PSP].”158 But the Judge of 
the FISC changed, and the new judge modified the Foreign Telephone and Email Order, making 
the court to make probable cause determinations instead of the government. The government 
contested that these modifications created “intelligence gap”.159 
The government attempted to make another effort. They wanted to use FISC to obtain 
orders authorizing compelling private companies “to assist the government in acquiring the 
communications of individuals located overseas who were suspected of engaging in terrorism 
and who used United States–based communication service providers.”160 Government contended 
that there were rigorous tests applied in order to gain FISA orders, showing that the targets were 
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“agents of foreign power”, located outside the United States and “communications being sought 
were frequently with other who were also located outside the United States.”161 
These new hassles “slowed and in some cases prevented the acquisition of foreign 
intelligence information.”162 Protect of America Act of 2007 and FISA Amendments Act of 
2008, eliminated the need to seek individual authorizations for surveillance. These are of 
particular importance to our study today. 
Report by the Director on National Intelligence to Congress reported that “Foreign 
Telephone and Email Order had resulted in degraded acquisition of communications, combined 
with reports of a heightened terrorist threat environment.”163 This was intended to speed up 
Congress in passing a more ‘suitable’ legislation. It succeeded. In August 2007, Protect America 
Act (PAA) was passed by Congress and signed by the President. PAA was “a legislative 
forerunner to what is now Section 702 of FISA.”164 The perk of the new law was that it was to 
live only for 180 days.  
And suddenly, PAA united those both attempted forces that the government put into 
place into one. And PAA being only a temporary measure, Congress started working on the 
permanent one. In July 2008, FISA Amendments Act was signed into law, which “replaced the 
expired Protect America Act provisions with the new Section 702 of FISA.”165 Despite all the 
problems the reader already sees and the study will discuss below, FAA is more legitimate than 
PSP for the only reason that it was passed through legitimate legislative means.  
What is the scope of Section 702? FISA sanctions Attorney General and the Director of 
National Security to jointly authorize:  
1. “[T]argeting of persons who are not United States persons,  
2. “[W]ho are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States,  
3. “[W]ith the compelled assistance of an electronic communication service provider,  
4. “[I]n order to acquire foreign intelligence information.”166 
As in any legislation there are definitions and limitations. Persons, mentioned, might be 
“groups, entities, associations, corporations, or foreign powers.”167 The foreign powers might be 
governments but not the whole nations. Accordingly, 50 U.S.C. §1801(i) defines what US person 
is – it is US citizen, permanent resident, virtually all US corporations and groups substantially 
composed of US citizens and permanent residents. Furthermore, no person located in the United 
States can be targeted, nor can the government target a foreign entity “if the purpose of the 
acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United 
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States.”168 Surveillance can be authorized only to acquire foreign intelligence information. 
“Foreign intelligence information concerning non-U.S. persons is defined in FISA as information 
that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against an actual or potential attack by a 
foreign power; sabotage, international terrorism, or the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction by a foreign power; or clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign power.”169 
In contrast to FISA, FAA does not require the government to show probable cause to 
believe that the surveillance target is a foreign power or agent.
170
 Actually, the mere fact that 
data in a device is encrypted already makes it a subject of collection, interception and storage of 
this data.
171
 Also, though the targets should have been outside the United States, the interception 
location was never specified.
172
 For example, the communication intercepted transited through 
the United States but the two persons targeted are non-US persons located outside the United 
States. Or the two targeted non-US persons in their intercepted communication are discussing a 
US person. Or because of a simple mistake, the target is a US person. But this US person cannot 
be intentionally targeted.
173
  
Furthermore, the compliance oversight with the statutory requirements were effectively 
transited from the FISC to Attorney General or the Director of National Intelligence.
174
 Thereby, 
Section 702 decreased the level of judicial monitoring.  
Every year, the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence make 
certifications to the FISC seeking authorization for targeting non-US persons reasonably 
believed to be located outside the United States to gather foreign intelligence information. It 
must be noted that specifics to what person(s) in particular, where and how is targeted are not 
required.
175
 Instead, categories of foreign intelligence information are identified. But these 
procedures and certifications might be of no real legal use and just a mere formality, for the FISC 
does not determine if any of the standards were met. What the FISC determines is if 
minimization procedures have satisfied the set criteria and the “procedures are reasonably 
designed to ensure compliance with certain limitations.”176 These limitations include, but of 
course not limited to, intentional acquisition of wholly domestic communications. Minimization 
procedures are aimed to control “acquisition, retention, and dissemination of any non-publicly 
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available US person information acquired through the Section 702 program.”177And after 
analysis, the FISC should determine if the acquisition meets Fourth Amendment requirements 
and issue a written opinion on why it does. Seeing that the program still exists even after 
Snowden leaks, the Courts might be really ones to blame for their traditional deference of 
national security matters to the executive. As we shall see below, there is a chance that this 
deference is slowly ending.  
After order authorizing acquisition has been granted, the Attorney General and DNI send 
directives to communication providers to compel their cooperation in interception of these 
communications. These providers can protest and appeal the decision of FISC to the FISCR and 
then to the Supreme Court. 
The process of surveillance is similar to one under Section 215 of Patriot Act. Here, too, 
the people are targets and their communication means (e.g. phone numbers or email addresses) 
are selectors (which are tasked). And though tasking process is individualized, in 2013 alone 
89,138 persons were targeted under Section 702.
178
 There are two types of acquisition under 
Section 702 – PRISM and “upstream” collection.  
Under PRISM, the government (NSA on behalf of FBI) submits to communication 
service provider, that received the directive, the selector. In turn, the service provider should 
provide the government with all communications to or from the selector until the selector is 
“detasked”. The raw data can then be provided to the FBI and CIA. In all agencies, the agents 
then are analyzing the data to ensure compliance with minimization processes and targeting 
requirements before surveillance is uploaded to database. External compliance oversight is 
further executed by the DOJ and ODNI. If any noncompliance is found, they need to report those 
to Congress.
179
  
Under “upstream” collection, the government does not compel the service providers to 
submit data but instead the communication transit providers. “Upstream” is similar to the 
Olmstead case wiretapping. The government did not bug the phone itself, instead they took the 
contents of conversations from the wires, which connect the caller and receiver. However, in 
contrast to targeted wiretapping, “entire streams of Internet traffic flowing across major U.S. 
networks are acquired and searched.”180 In contrast to PRISM, FBI and CIA do not receive the 
raw data from upstream collection. The filters of tasking and minimization apply though too 
before the information is then uploaded to databases.
181
 
In addition to seeing what emails were sent from or received to the selector, the NSA is 
collecting “about” communication, which means that NSA can intercept communication of 
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persons in the United States who just mention the target or selector. But the enforcement 
agencies and the PCLOB claim that special minimization measures are applied there too not to 
obtain strictly domestic communication, such as IP filter.
182
 But, according to the government 
and the PCLOB, the system is not perfect and there are tens of thousands wholly domestic 
communications intercepted per year. Though it is tempting to discuss more, there is no need for 
that for as of May 1, 2017 (while this work is being written) the “about” collection has been 
discontinued by the NSA.
183
   
Also, there are Multi-Communication Transactions. These are communications initiated 
by a targeted non-US person outside the United States but then sent to the United States persons. 
These messages may further be exchanged exclusively between US persons and the target may 
no longer be even involved in the communication.  
Unfortunately, unlike with Section 215, PCLOB did not report extensive violations of 
public trust and compliance. They report that less than one percent of all inquiries are incidents 
of noncompliance since the inception of Section 702. Not wanting to commit a fallacy of 
composition, the nature of said violations should at least be noted, as reported by the PCLOB. 
Most common types were just delay in reporting of tasking and detasking to the DOJ and ODNI, 
or wrong selectors due to typographic errors. They also noted only two instances of reverse 
targeting. Other incidents, which were noted to be rare, involve systemic errors, such as those 
involving MCT or technological malfunction, and analysts targeting individuals without 
approval. However, the latter one is an important and dangerous noncompliance instance. 
Council on Foreign Relations reports that it is estimated that millions of Americans are targeted 
through Section 702. The interception of President Trump’s campaign workers’ communications 
that tie them to Russia, generated further concern that Section 702 can be used for political 
gain.
184
 Therefore, the real objectivity of PCLOB, in assessing the noncompliance and 
unconstitutionality of Section 702, is questionable. If anything, the estimates and facts that are 
seen today with “Russia hacking the U.S. election” fiasco, Section 702 has shown itself to be a 
dangerous unregulated weapon in the hands of the executive without any check.  
The most important part of Section 702 is 50 U.S.C. §1881a(b)(5). It stipulates that 
surveillance acquisition “shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the Fourth amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States.” Therefore, the next step of the study will do that indeed.  
 
a. Constitutionality 
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There are few cases up to date, or as far as it was found, that analyze the constitutionality 
of Section 702. It must be noted that they none of them ended up in the Supreme Court, at least 
yet.
185
 Nonetheless, they are of interest for our analysis, for even the Supreme Court narrates the 
precedents.  
Analysis of this section would be more extensive and complex than the previous one. 
There are many reasons for that. One is the complexity of Section 702 with all the safeguards put 
in place. Another is that the targets of Section 702 are foreigners located outside the United 
States who do not have Fourth Amendment protection.  
In the beginning of the first story there is a 19-year-old young man. In February 2009, 
Mohamed Osman Mohamud, naturalized US citizen from Somalia, began exchanging emails 
with, now deceased, al-Qaeda member.
186
 He was also in communication with a convicted 
terrorist in Saudi Arabia. In the latter communications, both discussed Mohamud’s trip to 
Pakistan and terrorist training. The trip never happened and FBI began their undercover 
operation. Mohamud and undercover agents made trial trips to detonate bombs and then FBI 
agents asked “what he hoped would happen to those attending the Portland holiday ceremony, a 
family event that includes people of all ages.” "I want whoever is attending that event to leave ... 
either dead or injured," said Mohamud. FBI implanted a fake bomb into the van, that Mohamud 
believed would blow up in the most public place in Oregon.  
Evidence presented at the trial hearing, as it is evident from the retelling, was obtained 
through Section 702 surveillance. The problem is that the government “failed to notify the 
defendant that there was section 702 evidence against him, but provided notice only of evidence 
collected pursuant to other section of FISA.”187 In appeal of this decision, argued in U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit, Mohamud pushed for recognition of many Constitutional 
encroachments on behalf of the government and Section 702 in particular, including separation 
of powers, First and Fourth Amendment violations. Due to space constraints, only Fourth 
Amendment aspect will be discussed.  
The Court found no violation of the Fourth Amendment in this case. “Although § 702 
potentially raises complex statutory and constitutional issues, this case does not. […] the initial 
collection of Mohamud's email communications did not involve so-called "upstreaming" or 
targeting of Mohamud under § 702, more controversial methods of collecting information. It also 
did not involve the retention and querying of incidentally collected communications.”188 This is 
important because for now it is the highest federal court that cast a doubt on constitutionality of 
Section 702 (and of pre-Freedom Act Section 215). The court, with this decision, codified the 
worries of the PCLOB. Up to date, it is the largest and most important recognition of the fact that 
collection of US persons’ communication under Section 702 are not accidental, infrequent or 
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inconsequential. “[C]ommunications between foreign targets and U.S. persons was specifically 
contemplated and to some degree desired….‘incidental’ collection of communications is not 
accidental, nor is it inadvertent…the term should not be understood to suggest that such 
collection is infrequent or that it is an inconsequential part of the Section 702 program”189 The 
court, nonetheless, analyzed the reasonableness of the search under the Fourth Amendment. 
Using the legitimate balancing test (which resembles rational basis test
190
), where the legitimate 
government interest is balanced against “the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy.”191 The only related criticism the author has on their analysis now is their 
implication that electronic communications, though recognized by this court equal to letters, 
have reduced expectation of privacy. But the quintessential aspect for Court’s decision was that 
Mohamud’s communication was sent to a third party, thereby diminishing Mohamud’s 
expectation of privacy. But the Court did not address whether the disclosure of mails to a third 
party was voluntary one and whether that mattered. But we shall go on. 
The other case involved two Uzbek refugees to United States (Jamshid Muhtorov and 
Bakhtiyor Jumaev). Ironically, one of the convicts of this case, Jamshid Muhtorov, was the head 
of human rights organization in Jizzakh who fled from prosecution (unrelated to terrorism) in 
Uzbekistan because of protection from lieutenant colonel of regional counter-terrorism squad.
192
 
These defendants were charged with provision of material support to a designated terrorist 
organization. Mr. Muhtorov, furthermore, was arrested on his one-way trip to Turkey due to 
surveillance information obtained through Section 702.  
Here too, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, recognized that “FAA is 
susceptible to unconstitutional application as an end-run around the Wiretap Act and the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless or unreasonable searches.”193 But, again, argued 
that in this case Section 702 was not unconstitutionally applied. Furthermore, it opened for 
discussion issue whether Section 702 violates Article III “case or controversy” requirement but 
did not discuss it, only stating that in this case it did not. And the collection of Mr. Muhtorov’s 
communication was incidental to surveillance of Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), an international 
terrorist organization. Therefore, statutory and constitutional.  
Even from the detached point of view, the analysis of Section 702 becomes too complex. 
This is for this very reason Supreme Court’s ruling is needed. 
In Riley, the Court already recognized the fast development of modern technology and 
that Constitutional protections should try to move with them. Even for an originalist this 
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argument seems plausible for people rarely send written letters to each other. Physical written 
communication is conducted usually for business matters. This is compared to, and in stark 
contrast to, extensive and, probably, exclusive use of letters in the 18
th
 Century. The intent of 
Framers was to protect the privacy of communications and, therefore, it must be accepted that 
people receiving or sending electronic messages or using any other electronic communication 
have reasonable expectations of privacy – that the society has such reasonable expectation of 
privacy. This is true especially taking into account that FISA Court and 6
th
 Circuit Court already 
treated electronic communication as letters ("Whether they are transmitted by letter, telephone or 
e-mail, a person's private communications are akin to personal papers").
194
 
Also, there seems to still remain a question on whether US persons located abroad remain 
under Fourth Amendment protection (see. Walsh). However, this question was long settled with 
Katz. “The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”195 Therefore, targeting of US 
persons still remains unavailable under Section 702.  
The next question comes to warrants. Fourth Amendment reads “and no196 Warrants shall 
issue, but upon
197
 probable cause.” It remains a mystery to the author why do the Courts still 
debate on reasonableness of judicial procedure under FAA for it clearly violates the Fourth 
Amendment. Under FAA Section 702, government is not required to illustrate probable cause to 
FISC. Therefore, question raised by Muhtorov’s case is viable one. As the Court itself 
recognized, “There would have been no “case or controversy” in Tortorello without Arthur 
Tortorello, and no “case or controversy” in Camara without Roland Camara.”198 This was said in 
relation that there is no judicial determination as to whether a person of interest can be subject to 
surveillance. Unfortunately, this Court did not analyze this issue extensively, for Muhtorov’s 
communication was incidental to surveillance conducted on recognized terrorist organization.  
We see similar language in the First Amendment, one might say, “Congress shall make 
no
199
 law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” but still not all speech is protected, 
such as incitement or defamation. Answering this reasonable objection, these are Court ruled 
exceptions to the law, while the Court allowed only few defined exceptions to warrant 
requirement and one still remains unaccounted for – national security. This study suggests that 
“national security” interest is vague and general, which renders the exception to become 
exception of the Fourth Amendment in general, for basically everything can be argued to be of 
national security matter.  
In regards to reasonableness of Section 702 search, it remains always reasonable in cases 
that really have gone to Courts. This is because, at least most of the times, these cases involve 
crimes committed or conspired to be committed, which have strong evidence of connection of 
suspects with alleged crimes. Plus, great majority of such cases are public and subject to Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. This study excludes cases conducted on 
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terrorists litigated in military courts or even without litigation at all. Nonetheless, the 
reasonableness standard cannot be applied to cases where there are compliance issues or where 
government did not find any evidence for terrorism ties. In any other scenario where 
communication is targeted on non-US person outside the United States, or at least involves such 
person or organization – an argument can legitimately be made that the communication of US 
person obtained was “incidental” to permitted Section 702 surveillance.  
A problem law enforcement may encounter is evidence of terrorism plot or ties obtained 
through Section 702 but through communication that was exclusively in the United States. This 
would make the interception of communication a violation of the Fourth Amendment and 
inadmissible in Court.  
The only viable solutions author sees for these problems is bringing back the FISA 
warrant requirement back to its original form – to require presentation of probable cause for each 
target, or at least for those that have a slightest suspicion, or in the course of investigation was 
found, to be connected to US persons. Thereby, executive branch would increase its 
constitutional legitimacy with Section 702 and put itself within the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution. Additionally, it will be prudent to cancel “upstream” collection 
of data for its great threat that most of the communication intercepted would be of US Persons 
unrelated to terrorism. Constitutionally, this “incidental” interception might justifiably be argued 
to be unreasonable search. Adaptation of these recommendations would slow down the 
intelligence work, as the government already argued. Nonetheless, this could be easily dealt with 
by increasing number of judges of FISC and their assistants, clerks. Allowing 24 hours of review 
would not put the nation in much greater danger. In case of emergency need, a process of 
expedited review can be devised and requested. Furthermore, technological modifications should 
be made to guarantee that analysts would not be able to insert selectors without FISC 
approval/warrant. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
This Chapter will analyze the privacy rights and the counter-intelligence methods of two 
of the most populous, economically developed and politically influential countries in the 
European Union – France and the United Kingdom200.  
It is vital to note that, in contrast to the United States, the right to privacy in the European 
Union is codified and not implied or interpreted through precedents, like it is in the U.S. One can 
find the right to privacy in Article 8 of European Convention on Human Rights:  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
201
  
It is only prudent to give a brief introduction to the Convention and how applicable to 
individual European States it is.  
As a response to horrendous experience of fascism and Nazism in Europe in the middle 
of the twentieth century, European States decided to bind themselves to an agreement 
establishing minimum standards of human rights in the continent. Furthermore, they set out to 
establish a judicial structure “whereby they could insure the identification and security of those 
rights.”202 European Nations drafted European Convention on Human Rights (“European 
Convention”) during 1949 and 1950s. It came to force in 1953 when eight out of thirteen 
signatory States ratified the convention.
203
  
Today, all 47 members of the Council of Europe are members to the European 
Convention. They are all subject to binding decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (Committee of Ministers). 
What is vital for the interest of this study is that the Council of Europe consists of States not 
members to the European Union, including Russia. And though the ECHR cannot invalidate the 
laws, as the SCOTUS can, they can make a declaratory judgment that the State is in breach of the 
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Convention. The Committee of Ministers, in turn, can require contracting States to comply with 
the decision of the Court and with the language of the convention.  
There is relevant case law on the Article 8, that is applicable to the study today. It is 
Silver v. United Kingdom
204
 and Klass v. Germany. In Klass, the court found that the interference 
with the private and family life is reasonable when: it is in accordance with law,  
“necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of 
others.”205 
Silver v. United Kingdom clarified what the term “necessary” means: 
“a) Necessary is not synonymous with “indispensable” nor has it the flexibility of such 
expressions as “admissible”, “ordinary”, “useful”, “reasonable” or “desirable” . 
b) The contracting States enjoy a certain but not unlimited margin of appreciation in the 
matter of the imposition of restrictions, but it is for the Court to give the final ruling on 
whether they are compatible with the Convention. 
c) The phrase “necessary in a democratic society” means that, to be compatible with the 
Convention, the interference must, [inter alia], correspond to a “pressing social need” 
and be “proportionate to the limited aim pursued. 
d) Those paragraphs of Articles of the Convention which provide for an exception to a 
right guaranteed are to be narrowly interpreted.”206 
In James v. United Kingdom
207
, the court created a proportionality test, whereby the 
proportionality requirement, as seen in the point “d)” above, will be assessed by the Court. The 
test requires that the law must have a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aim sought to be [realized].” 208 In effect, this standard is similar to 
rational basis test, discussed above.
209
 But one may argue as to which one of those test gives a 
stricter scrutiny and liberties protection. Rational basis, inter alia, requires that the aim must be 
legitimate. Whereas, the proportionality test requires no such thing. On the other hand, 
proportionality test taken together with the standard put in Silver create higher liberty protection 
because the law should “correspond to a pressing social need.” Which of them end up giving 
more protections is a matter of discussion and maybe another separate study.  
Right to privacy can also be found in Article 8 of EU Charter on Fundamental Rights: 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
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Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him 
or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority.
210
 
The real power of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights is under challenge. The Charter 
itself, when created and ratified, took a non-binding force. Maybe that is the reason indeed why 
all members and institutions of the European Union are parties to it. What is crucial to the study 
is that people cannot take their governments to the court for not upholding their obligations 
under the Charter. Therefore, the Charter has a framework nature and it is up to individual 
member states to ascend to the standards set by it or not.  
These are to keep in mind. Now the study will begin analysis of counter-intelligence 
practice. The first country will be France.  
In Chapter II, a technology was briefly mentioned – IMSI-catchers. To refresh, the study 
explained that IMSI-catchers are: 
[A] more advanced technology used by law enforcement agencies to intercept in real time 
“unique device identifiers and detailed location information of cellular phones—data that it would 
otherwise be unable to obtain without the assistance of a wireless carrier.”211 This technology can 
potentially send signals through the walls to locate and identify cell phones without service provider 
assistance or anyone knowing about that.
212
 
Analysis in this chapter will start with France. The right to privacy in France is an 
incredibly complicated issue. Article 9 of the Civil Code, Article 226 of the Criminal Code, Data 
Protection Act 78-17, Postal and Electronic Communication Code, UN Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948 (Article 12), European Convention on Human Rights (Article 8) and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article 7) – these all, in principle, guarantee the 
right to privacy to French citizens and persons. However, France does not have such stringent 
rules on warrants like the United States.
213
 And, in essence, the law enforcement agencies have 
broad liberty on search, especially if the matters concern counter-terrorism efforts.
214
  
After events at Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack that left 12 people dead, French passed a 
controversial mass surveillance law.
215
 With this law, the law enforcement received a carte 
blanche to surveil the entire French population, without an effective oversight. Reason why 
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effective was added as a qualifier is because National Commission for Control of Intelligence 
Techniques (CNCTR) was created as an oversight body.
216
 However, it does not have a hard 
power to veto or stop any techniques – it is effectively an advisory board.217  
This law authorized interception of phone calls and emails without judicial warrant. 
Additionally, the law sanctions bulk collection of metadata and use of IMSI-catchers.
218
 Through 
the law, intelligence agencies will be able to use keyloggers to track every key stroke on a 
computer as well as implant microphones and video surveillance cameras into private property 
premises.  
It is safe to say that human rights groups, judges, tech companies and international human 
rights bodies, such as UN Human Rights Committee, have extensively criticized the new law for 
its vagueness, lack of oversight or even power to review from any other branch and its 
discriminatory nature.
219
 Nonetheless, as discussed above, one can take France to the ECHR on 
the basis of failing the proportionality test. It would be unreasonable to assume that such 
overboard personal data interception with explicit exclusion of any judicial or legislative 
oversight is proportional or even reasonable in the democratic regime for the narrow aim of war 
against terror. Nonetheless, it may be argued, that if rational basis test is applied then the French 
surveillance program might see another day. Compare that to strict scrutiny standard, which 
would strike down the law.  
The other side of la Manche did not fall behind either. On November 2016, a new 
intelligence law was passed, which authorized mass surveillance and bulk collection of metadata 
– the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA).220 The law has great resemblance to the Section 215 and 
Section 702 of the Patriot Act and FAA respectively. It consists of nine parts plus schedules. The 
bill distinguishes between targeted and bulk surveillance and collection. Part 2 talks about 
targeted interception of communication content. It is to be done through a “double lock” 
oversight mechanism, where the Secretary of State signs off the warrant subject to Judicial 
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Commissioner’s approval.221 However, the bill’s language is structured in such a way that it 
practically makes the Judicial Commissioner to give deference to the Secretary’s judgement. 
Please note, similar to FISC in its deference to the executive. The difference between the two 
bills in that aspect, more particularly between this bill and Section 702 of the FAA, is that 
surveillance over American persons, that is citizens, permanent residents and everyone on the 
territory of the United States, is statutorily prohibited, whilst here it is indiscriminate. 
Furthermore, even if the Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve the warrant, the intelligence 
body should stop the surveillance “as soon as possible”, rather than immediately.222 The law also 
authorizes maintaining databases of personal communications data, as well as interception of 
data from electronic equipment and the bulk collection of overseas communications. The 
problem with the latter is that it is also vague as the rest of the bill as is Section 702 of FAA – the 
exact definition and nature of overseas communication is not defined. Therefore, potentially 
anyone who would send an email or call abroad can become subject of surveillance without 
being suspected and involved in terrorism. Also, similar to the FAA and Patriot Act, the 
telecommunication companies are directed to retain the communication data of their customers 
for a period of time of 12 months.
223
 
The study is discussing only officially recognized government surveillance programs. It 
must be noted that a large number of those are known only because of the leaks Edward 
Snowden gave to the world. Besides these there are still those, which are unrecognized. These 
programs include “Nosey Smurf”, “GUMFISH”, “Dreamy Smurf”, “Tracker Smurf”, “Paranoid 
Smurf” and “Foggybottom”. These all are allegedly used by the GCHQ with the cooperation and 
coordination from the NSA, according to Edward Snowden and the documents he revealed.
224
 To 
illustrate how problematic these programs are, the study will briefly mention what they entail. 
“Nosey Smurf” is a technology that allows listening to people’s conversations through their 
devices even if they are turned off.
225
 “Dreamy Smurf” allows turning on and off a device 
without user’s knowledge.226 GUMFISH is the technology that scares people into taping over 
their web-cameras – it allows GCHQ to access any webcam and film or take pictures of things 
the web-camera sees.
227
 Edward Snowden reports that there are cooperation agreements with the 
leading EU powers and the intelligence agencies in the United States for information and 
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technology sharing.
228
 Therefore, it must be of no surprise that NSA will have access to the 
information GCHQ will gather, or request GCHQ to obtain desired surveillance, or use the very 
same technology but claim British hand.  
But return back to exclusive British surveillance. Because the United Kingdom is part of 
European Convention of Human Rights, the right to privacy of British citizens is protected by 
Article 8 of the said convention. In 2016, European Court of Justice gave a major blow to the 
IPA, ruling that forceful retention of communications data by telecommunication companies of 
all their customers is unlawful. Earlier, European Court of Human Rights delivered an opinion 
over Hungarian mass surveillance program ruling that indiscriminate mass surveillance is in 
violation of people’s right to privacy. Therefore, the only thing that is left from these blows is the 
targeted surveillance, assuming that the U.K. government will follow the court’s interpretation of 
the Convention and, thereby, uphold its obligations under it.  
In the beginning of the chapter, the author presented the two main privacy provisions in 
the human rights mechanisms of the European Union. The flaws of the presented laws in regards 
to civil liberties the study is discussing are clear but still they are different in nature. Beginning 
with the European Convention on Human Rights, the flaw is the national security exception. The 
problem of such an exception, as discussed in the sections about the American law, is that, in 
effect, it grants a full discretionary power to law enforcement agencies. Inter alia, such an 
exception permits surveillance in conflict to guaranteed civil rights and liberties, potentially 
allowing law enforcement crackdown on such freedoms as freedom of speech and association. 
As it was seen in the American practice and it is seen by plain look over the counter-intelligence 
laws in France and the U.K. Furthermore, accepting that these laws are a requirement of time in 
the wake of terrorist attacks by Islamist radicals, it opens up an opportunity for discrimination 
against religious minorities.  
Only proportionality test under James may give hope to the plaintiffs in cases against 
their governments over their mass surveillance programs. Hope is not assured power to win 
though, for an argument can be made that terrorism is a constantly unknown threat to which any 
such restrictive measure is proportionate if the end goal this method is sought for is the ultimate 
safety of the people and the stability of democratic system. And this argument satisfies the Klass 
and, maybe even, the Silver standards, as analyzed above.   
The second flaw is in the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, in the second clause of 
Article 8. The problem is the expression – “some other legitimate basis laid down by law.”229 
Counter-intelligence and security interests of a nation are legitimate government interest and the 
mass surveillance is put in paper as a law. Therefore, it is greatly plausible that in case of a Court 
hearing, the state can argue that it does not violate the Article for the law sets down the standard 
for being able to violate the right to privacy – either by consent or for legitimate governmental 
interest. Therefore, satisfying one will be enough to be within the parameters of the Article. To 
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resolve the first flaw, the Members of the Union should amend the Article 8, as well as any other 
article that gives national security exceptions to civil rights and liberties, to define the limits to 
these exceptions and list prohibited practices. The second flaw’s resolve is also in the definition 
and clarification of what is the legitimate basis, where are its limits, what types of laws can 
governments not pass. 
However, a sum-up is needed. In essence, the practice of the United States in Patriot Act 
and the FAA is not much different than practice of the intelligence agencies in the European 
Union, even when the people of the E.U. have statutory protections of their right to privacy. 
What is surprising and worrying is that even if the United States does not have written right to 
privacy in the Constitution, it is protected by it because of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the 
United States has the Fourth Amendment. But France having the right to privacy does not 
specify the right to privacy from government surveillance. The United Kingdom was found to 
have the right to privacy only because of ratification of the EU Human Right mechanisms 
discussed above. The passage of laws authorizing such mass surveillance is evidence that these 
rights are not properly protected and these European states are much closer to a verge on 
becoming official police states. The United States, on the other hand, has working mechanism of 
checks on the executive. These working mechanisms and standards, though not foolproof as seen 
by failure of the Supreme Court to start analyzing the counter-intelligence laws, do work and in 
effect give much higher protection to the people, on its face, than do the mechanisms and 
standards of the E.U. Recent changes to the practice of the NSA are illustrative enough.
230
   
                                                 
230
 Statement - NSA Stops Certain Section 702 "Upstream" Activities, National Security Agency (April 28, 2017), 
https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-room/statements/2017-04-28-702-statement.shtml; Ellen Nakashima, NSA 
halts controversial email collection practice to preserve larger surveillance program, The Washington Post (April 
28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-halts-controversial-email-collection-
practice-to-preserve-larger-surveillance-program/2017/04/28/e2ddf9a0-2c3f-11e7-be51-b3fc6ff7faee_story.html; 
Adam Klein, The End of “About” Collection under Section 702, Lawfare (May 1, 2017, 10:07 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/end-about-collection-under-section-702.  
 50 
CHAPTER V.  
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM FINDINGS 
 
As with any analytical work, it was important for the study to have a comparative 
element. Such element was presented in the previous chapter, which concluded, inter alia, by 
noting that the United States’ judicial protections of civil liberties seem higher than those of their 
European counterparts. Therefore, now the study will turn to recommendations. These 
recommendations will be directed primarily to American counter-intelligence, counter-terrorism 
and surveillance practices. This will be done not only because the study itself focuses heavily on 
American law. But also because these recommendations may well serve as guidelines for 
improvement to our European colleagues too, due to higher judicial protections of civil liberties 
American system affords. At least in this area.  
When trying to put the ultimate sacrifice of people’s right to privacy in balance against 
the value of prevention of terrorist attacks – the outcome will be different depending on who is 
putting these two on balance. Unfortunately, looking at the war on terror, or wars in general, in a 
more skeptical way, one would see that wars are profitable for many actors in the conflict. The 
terrorist attacks are profitable. They have many benefits including being a counter-balance to 
growing population, an additional mechanism of control over population and its attitudes, 
increase in investments in infrastructure of affected places, increase in profits from taxes from 
military industry, controlled and predicted leaps in market of natural resources. Furthermore, a 
constant state of danger allows governments to market their anti-democratic laws easier, such as 
the Investigatory Powers Act and FAA, and potentially giving the government institutions 
greater oversight of what people say, do or contemplate about. Therefore, in effect it seems 
hypocritical to say that these counter-terrorism laws have positive effect over prevention of 
terrorist attacks when it may be deducted that the very existence of such threat is in the interest 
of some governments.  
The case to prove the point can be the journalistic study of Taliban by Ahmed Rasheed. 
There, the author of this book has met with the greatest warlords of the civil war in Afghanistan, 
including the leaders of Taliban and intelligence officers of Pakistan. The author of this book has 
vividly illustrated, arguably intentionally, indirect financing of Taliban by the United States and 
direct financing of Taliban by Pakistan. With Taliban, it has been shown, the supporting states 
had potential to control the gas transit from Turkmenistan to Pakistan, as well as total control 
over drug production and traffic from Afghanistan.
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So, in effect, the study offers recommendations for improvement of the practices. The 
study argues that taking into account the grave danger that these practices might be detrimental 
to a democratic society – these practices need to be limited and always targeted, put into a bigger 
oversight by independent, and checked bodies, and the bulk collection of any personal data 
should be eliminated. These will be shorter than expected in the start for the length constraints. 
a. Section 215 
Congress’ decision to end bulk metadata collection, under Freedom Act, is consistent 
with the PCLOB recommendations and Circuit Court’s findings. Nonetheless, it is unclear why 
does PCLOB hail the said Act. Whilst claiming that Section 215 was of basically no use to the 
intelligence community, it is curious to know why would the American people continue to need 
it. Admittedly, the intelligence community may need call detail records of certain suspects. To 
that end and taking into account value of the program to counter-terrorism efforts, the author has 
several recommendations: 
 
Recommendation 1: Obtain a probable cause warrant under the Fourth 
Amendment from a district court or the FISC. Upon receipt of the warrant, the executive 
would have permission to search up to two hops. Furthermore, the warrant should be 
effective long enough for the intelligence agency to search for any “identifiers” that are of 
interest to the investigation. Otherwise, if no identifiers have matched, the agency, after the 
warrant expires, would have to delete all the hops data. The fruits of the search of the 
identified target can remain at the disposal of the law enforcement agencies for longer. The 
length should be identified by experts in technology and criminal investigations.    
Explanation: If the value of Section 215 is limited to mostly confirming what suspicions 
the law enforcement have, then added safeguards will not detrimentally slow down the 
operations. If adopted, this recommendation may increase number of requests for use of Section 
215. This has a positive effect of having the judiciary fully informed of what the executive is 
doing. Nonetheless, the operations of the intelligence community will not be critically slowed 
down. Reason for that is expected heightened carefulness of the NSA on requesting the warrant. 
This, in turn, would still bring additional sought confirmations of ties to terrorism, increase 
legitimacy of the program and, most importantly, strengthen civil rights protections.  
  
Recommendation 2: If violations of these procedures occur, retraining and 
substantial fines on analysts, and/or their superiors who gave the orders, could serve as 
effective punitive mechanism. The agency in which the violations occurred should file a 
report outlining punitive procedures and steps taken.  
Explanation: People have proven to be money driven animals in their great majority. 
There are numerous works written on corruption, its causes, how to combat and prevent it. One 
of the first and fundamental steps in any combat against corruption would be the increase in pay 
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and possible punishments if caught. This would increase the price of corruption and make one 
less inclined to take a bribe. Now coming back to the recommendation, the reverse is viable too. 
Everyone needs to feed him/herself and the family (be that 10+ person family, or just a dog 
waiting home), if you put financial incentive on not breaking the rules (besides obvious 
termination) it makes anyone more careful and accountable.  
Retraining would play psychological role too, because no one likes retraining. Some 
could even prefer money fine than retraining.  
If any of the two recommendations is accepted, the threshold of numbers of violations 
could be defined by the FISC. Also, compliance mechanisms should be set up in intelligence 
community, similar to those in private sector. In particular, by implementing, among those, 
anonymous reporting mechanisms could substantially lower the risk of leaks committed by 
Snowden or Chelsea Manning. The reports could be then sent to a specially formed “intelligence 
watchdog agency”, or be directly reported to Senate Intelligence Committee. An additional 
safeguard should be added too – threat that information will go public if Senate Intelligence 
Committee will be inactive. Another option could be a special website set up by the government 
where intelligence employees could anonymously raise concerns, with strict prohibition to reveal 
any specific intelligence information (such as names, locations, technology). These could 
facilitate open public discourse, leading to favorable (to the people) reaction by Congress and 
decrease of blind deference of judiciary to the executive in matters concerning national security 
and civil rights and liberties.  
 
b. Section 702 
In regards to Section 702 of FAA, the recommendations remain the same as in the 
analysis of this Section.  
Recommendation 1: Bring back FISA to its original form and require individual 
determinations based on probable cause for FISA warrant on communication interception 
by the FISC.  
Explanation: As the study discovered, Congress was incredibly careful to delineate the 
exercise of Section 702. In essence, Section 702 does not violate the Fourth Amendment for it is 
directed towards non-US persons located abroad. These people cannot and do not have 
protections of the United States Constitution even if it is the United States agency conducting a 
search. The Constitution reads, “We the People of the United States,” and therefore any 
provision of the Constitution (be that explicitly written or implied) belongs to the People of the 
United States. The question arises on who are those people? And it seems that the Court has 
already answered this question – it is anyone who is a US Citizen, Permanent Resident or a 
person currently located in the United States.  
Any US Person’s intercepted communication is “incidental” to the search. However, the 
problems associated with this were discussed – numerous times the real target of the search 
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could have been a US person. This could have most likely occurred through reverse targeting, 
upstream collection and “about” communication. “About” communication interception is 
cancelled by the NSA so only two are left. Upstream collection is most controversial because of 
its, arguably, uncontrolled interception of communication. On April 28
th
, 2017, the NSA 
informed that it halted the “upstream” collection of data because of some non-compliance issues. 
Reverse targeting is intentional disobedience to the Constitution and statutory law of Section 
702.  
The FISC determination of giving the warrant and existence of probable cause is vital to 
bring the practice within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment. It will also increase 
legitimacy of the surveillance practices of the NSA if a US person would be connected to a 
terrorist plot.  
 
Recommendation 2: Elimination of “upstream” collection. 
Explanation: It is unlikely NSA would rule out upstream collection from their playbook, 
thus the Supreme Court is needed. Why Supreme Court? Because up to now only Supreme Court 
takes into account all aspects, can act independent (and even contrary) to precedents, and now 
begins to take into account the developing nature of technology and showing willingness (from 
both isles) to adapt Fourth Amendment to the 21
st
 Century. Circuit Courts on the other side, as 
the study discovered, are willing to lean on the side of the executive and give deference to the 
executive in the matters of national security. As it was discovered, the American courts are not 
the only ones to do so. The executive is probably the best informed and skillful branch of all who 
can handle the national security. Nonetheless, if the judiciary sacrifices rights and liberties of 
American people and residents, then they do not faithfully execute the role bestowed upon them 
– to protect those very rights and liberties from governmental encroachment. Especially they will 
not execute their roles as checks and balances to each other. If government is competent as it 
always claims to be, there is no doubt they have manpower and material resources to conduct 
extensive surveillance that would be both – in conformity with the Fourth Amendment and 
legitimate. Legitimacy would stir down any possible uproar from leaks like those after Snowden 
or Manning. Supreme Court is people’s best hope. 
 
c. Overall 
It has been argued that if Congress would have better oversight over the practices of the 
intelligence community, some problems would be solved.
232
 However, as it is seen through 
experience of the UK and France, Congress might not be the protector and best representor of the 
people’s interest in such matters. Therefore, the following recommendation is prudent. 
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Recommendation 1: Create an independent oversight board consistent from 
representatives chosen by judiciary, legislature and executive. The legislature should be 
represented by representatives from the House of Representatives. The reports they 
produce should be made public.  
Explanation: An oversight board is satisfaction of the mechanisms set down in the Constitution 
and explained by Framers in the Federalist Papers regarding checks and balances. An 
independent oversight board is an additional level of security and legitimacy for the programs. 
The importance of choosing a representative(s) from House of Representatives is in their short 
terms. As explained in the Federalist 52 and 53, the shortness will make sure they always and 
only represent the interests of their constituents. So, if anything goes wrong and this board did 
not report that – the wrath of the people would fall on Congress too (and not only the executive). 
The publicity of their reports would limit the ability of thorough reporting. However, an 
oversight of what takes place will nonetheless be useful to the people. 
 
Recommendation 2: Guarantee that every current and future surveillance program’s 
operations would be going through approval of judiciary. So, if FISC warrants are needed 
– the satisfaction of standards and creation of standards should be judiciary’s prerogative.  
Explanation: the judicial standards are always a prerogative of the judiciary itself, the 
intelligence matters should be of no exception. The satisfaction of the standards is also the 
prerogative of the judiciary and the national security shall be no different.  
 
Recommendation 3: An independent office of civil rights and liberties defender should be 
created. This office would consist of a lawyer, with a great expertise in civil rights and 
liberties protections, and a technologist, who will be an expert in Information Technology, 
including surveillance technologies and techniques. This office will analyze each request of 
the executive for the FISC warrant or do that after the granting of the warrant to file 
complaints to the FISCR.  
Explanation: Because the intelligence is secretive, there was no counter-balance to the 
government as it is in usual criminal law by the defendants’ lawyers. This office would create 
such counter-balance.   
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CONCLUSION 
Today, the study looked at an extensive overview of Section 215 of USA PATRIOT Act 
and Section 702 of FISA Amendments Act, while also giving an insight into practices of British 
and French governments. Taken together, these were then compared and recommendations were 
given.  
Looking over the precedents allowed the reader to understand where the Court stands 
right now in regards to the Fourth Amendment. Taking that into account and tracing each, 
Section 215 and Section 702, study found fundamental constitutional problems they pose. 
However, each one poses a different problem. Section 215 presents little value to the cause of 
fight against terror, or finding new terrorists, or stopping coming attacks. After the analysis, it 
was reasoned that because of Riley, it is very possible that the Court could find that metadata that 
government could freely request should be protected under the Fourth Amendment. USA 
FREEDOM Act amended Section 215 and brought it in line with stricter constitutional 
interpretation, ending bulk collection of data and eliminating the record archives.  
Nonetheless, USA FREEDOM Act did not do much for Section 702, which, despite 
ending the “about” communication collection and halting “upstream” collection, still has a great 
number of controversies that violate the Fourth Amendment. The most obvious is the warrant 
requirement. FAA changed traditional FISA warrant requirement and got rid of probable cause 
determination on each target. This is on top of the reverse targeting and more than clear 
probability that “upstream” collection will be renewed.  
Looking at European law, the study did not find as many differences as intended. EU 
Member States are passing harsher counter-terrorism laws that violate citizens’ right to privacy, 
which, in contrast to the US, is codified. In fact, it was shown that France and the UK have 
publicly known and recognized programs that are much worse (liberty-wise) than practices under 
Section 215 and 702.  
In total there were seven recommendations, two per each Section analyzed and three 
additional ones on overall intelligence practices. Preservation of traditional warrant requirements 
in the counter-intelligence and national security practices were advised. With Section 215, 
because it did not show much value for counter-terrorism efforts, the inevitable slowdown of 
process should not be of great damage. With Section 702 it is obvious, especially after Riley 
court, that communications and data people have on their phones are protected under the Fourth 
Amendment. Furthermore, strict textual read of the Fourth Amendment dictates to obtain a 
warrant when search is conducted. Because NSA surveillance does not meet the exceptions, 
Riley commands that interception of communication between US person requires a warrant.  
This issue was incredibly complex and intriguing. If more time, resources and space were 
available, practices of EU Member States would be studied more extensively and 
recommendations would be given in their regard. For now, general recommendations put in 
place for the US are as advisable for the EU Member States. Another interesting topic would be 
the right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment and how it applies to Section 702 or even 
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Big Data, by balancing business interests with reasonable expectations of privacy of the society 
in the internet. 
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